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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Law-The Right of the State to Appeal in Criminal Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
The arguments against allowing a governmental authority to
appeal in criminal cases are founded on historical experience. The
early kings of England defined criminality and persecuted those who
opposed them.' They ordered the lords, barons, or others owing
allegiance to them to sound the "hue and cry" and arrest these
criminals in their name.' The prosecution of the criminal proceeded
under the watchful eye and guidance of the Crown in courts subject
to its influence.3
Two great abuses arose from this system of law enforcement.
The King, having the authority to make the laws and determine
which individuals were criminals, often failed to make that determi-
nation on the basis of social benefit or welfare. He could name as
criminals those subjects who were objectionable to him personally
and ignore social considerations. The other great danger in this
scheme was the possibility of repeated attempts by the Crown to gain
a conviction of the accused for his alleged offense irrespective of his
actual guilt or innocence. This process of multiple trials is modern-
ly recognized by the name "double jeopardy." The basis of double
jeopardy is the possibility that the accused, found innocent by his
peers, could have the facts of his case redetermined on the request
of the State.4
These early abuses led, in part, to the signing of the Magna
Carta5 which established that the government was below the law
I POOLE, DOMESDAY BOOK TO MAGNA CARTA 385-87 (1951).
2 PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 378 (2d ed.
1936) ; Poole, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10, 392 (1951) ; PouND & PLUCKNETT,
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 55-61 (3d ed. 1927).
8 PLUCKNETT, op. cit. sipra note 2, at 82-86.
'Double jeopardy means the defendant is twice put in danger of convic-
tion for the same offense. State v. Watson, 209 N.C. 229, 183 S.E. 286
(1935). This could occur in several ways. An accused could be tried
repeatedly for the same offense in the trial courts. He could be convicted,
pay his penalty, and then be retried. Or he could be tried in a lower court
and carried to appellate courts by the Crown until he was convicted. The
rule of double jeopardy prohibits a second punishment for a single offense as
well as a second trial even if the defendant has never received punishment.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
5 Poole, op. cit. supra note 1, at 477. The Magna Carta was signed at
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and not above it. Thus, the rule developed that the Crown could
not, on its own motion, appeal criminal cases to a higher court.'
This restriction was absolute and barred appeals regardless of ques-
tions of double jeopardy. The idea that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense was carried over to the colonies
and remains a sacred principle in American criminal law. It is
expressed in our various constitutions7 and is recognized in every
court.
8
The dangers of persecution that existed under the kings are
still present to some degree under our representative form of gov-
ernment. The state retains both the power to enact the law and the
authority to enforce it, but due to improvements, both organizational
and social, these dangers are not imminent. Organizationally, these
improvements are found in the governmental doctrine of separation
of powers. No longer does a single authority legislate criminal
codes, pursue the criminal and prosecute him at will. Social ad-
vances also play a large part in reducing harrassment of individuals.
The right to vote and better educational and communicative facili-
ties have made the more enlightened wishes of the people known to
government officials. Consequently many jurisdictions have seen
fit to allow the State to appeal in those criminal cases where questions
of double jeopardy do not arise.
No appeal involving only questions of law could amount to
double jeopardy. If the doctrine is interpreted as a bar to the right
of the State to" appeal in all criminal prosecutions, some obviously
guilty individuals might be released to plague society. These re-
leases would occur not because there was a possibility of double
jeopardy but because the State could not appeal its legal questions.
Logic demands that the law be correctly applied in criminal cases.
Runnynede in 1215 and reissued three times in the following three centuries.
Id. at 477-78.
' "At common law, the state cannot appeal.... [W]hether an appeal or
writ of error will be at the instance of the state under the constitutional
provision as to double jeopardy would seem to depend on the construction
given to the provision by the court.... [T]he constitutional provisions
differ in different states. Some provide that no one shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense; others that no one shall be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... [M]ost courts hold these phrases to be
synonymous, and to prohibit a second trial for any offense." CLARK, CRIM-
INALr PROCEDuRE 453 (2d ed. 1918).
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; N.C. CoxsT. art. I, § 17.
'As North Carolina has stated the rule, "No man shall be twice vexed
for the same offense." State v. West, 71 N.C. 263, 264 (1874). See also
State v. Credle, 63 N.C. 506 (1869) ; State v. Taylor, 8 N.C. 462 (1821).
[Vol. 42
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If an appeal by the State is required to get the correct application,
such appeal should be allowed. This thinking weighs heavily in some
states,9 less in others.' The trend in North Carolina has been to
allow a relatively small degree of appellate authority on behalf of
the State, limiting it to a few areas and refusing to grant appeal on
many questions of law. North Carolina holds dear the feeling that
the expansion of appellate powers of the State is action in an area,
where its ancestors feared to tread and that it should avoid such
action."
Early case law on the right of the State to appeal in North Caro-
lina was inconsistent. At first, there was an absolute right on the
part of the State to appeal." However, this power was eliminated
in the early case of State v. Jones"3 which held that the State had
absolutely no power of appeal. This strict rule remained in effect
for fifty years, from 1809 until 1859,14 at which time the supreme
court again reversed its opinion and granted a very limited appellate
power to the State.'5 During the ensuing years the court developed
'E.g., CoNN. GEN'. STAT. § 54-96 (1958). This section authorizes mo-
tions for new trials after acquittal. State v. Carabetta, 106 Conn. 114, 137
At. 394 (1927); State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894). CONN.
GENq. STAT. § 54-96 (1958) is phrased as follows: "Appeals from the rulings
and decisions of the superior court or of the court of common pleas, upon
all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by
the state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme court
of errors, in the same manner and to the same effect as if made by the
accused."
"
0E.g., TEXAS CONST. art. 5, § 26 which allows no state appeal in
criminal cases.
"1 See State v. Savery, 126 N.C. 1083, 36 S.E. 22 (1900) where the
court adopted as its own the following words: "We think the ancient rule
of the common law has been sufficiently relaxed by our predecessors, and we
are unwilling to move a step further in the direction of discretion.... In
coming to this conclusion, we are aware that its effect may possibly be to turn
lose a bad man upon society, but it is better in the administration of law
[that] there should be an occasional instance of violence even to the sense
of public justice, than that a principle should be established which, in times of
civil commotion that may occur in the history of every country, would serve
as an engine of oppression in the hands of corrupt time-servers and irre-
sponsible judges to crush the liberties of the citizen." Id. at 1090-91, 36 S.E.
at 25.
"2 State v. McLelland, 1 N.C. 632 (1804); State v. Haddock, 3 N.C.
162 (1802).
- 5 N.C. 257 (1809).
1' Between 1809 and 1859 two recorded cases were decided concerning the
State's authority: State v. Taylor, 8 N.C. 462 (1821), which denied the
State's appeal and State v. Moore, 29 N.C. 228 (1847), which was deemed a
mistrial by the court and returned for venire de novo.
15 See State v. Barnes, 52 N.C. 20 (1859).
1964]
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the scope of that power through comprehensive case law'" until, by
1883, it had grown to encompass appeals by the State on most
questions of law which were apparent on the face of the record.
Not all questions of law could be appealed, but only those arising
from special verdicts, 17 verdicts upon demurrer of the defendant,' 8
upon motions to quash,1a and upon arrest of judgment.2 0
II. STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL BY THE STATE
In 1883, prompted either by its own conscience or by the growth
of the courts' power in determining the State's right to appeal, the
Assembly enacted a statute which codified the right.2 ' This codifica-
tion halted the growth of the power and put its control in the hands
of the legislature. This legislative control is exemplified by the
fact that the statute has remained almost unchanged since 1883.
Amendments have been made,2 2 but the resemblance between the
1883 case law and the present codification is evident : 2
"8 In 1869 it was decided the State had a "very small" right of appeal.
State v. Credle, 63 N.C. 506 (1869). In State v. Bailey, 65 N.C. 426, 427
(1871), it was stated that neither the State nor the defendant could appeal
from interlocutory judgments except in capital cases and serious misde-
meanors. Later came the statement that no appeal was allowed where a
general verdict of not guilty had been entered. State v. Freeman, 66 N.C.
647 (1872); State v. Phillips, 66 N.C. 646 (1872). Those errors of law
apparent on the face of the record were considered appealable. State v.
Bobbitt, 70 N.C. 81 (1874). In State v. West, 71 N.C. 263 (1874), the
defendant had been released because the trial judge ordered a verdict of
not guilty to be entered on the defendant's plea of former acquittal. The
solicitor appealed and the supreme court found that such a verdict was a
general verdict, and they could not accept the appeal unless it had been on
a special verdict.
., State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882); State v. Moore, 84 N.C. 724
(1881) ; State v. Padgett, 82 N.C. 544 (1880) ; State v. Lane, 78 N.C. 547
(1878).
18 State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882); State v. Moore, 84 N.C. 724
(1881); State v. Swepson, 82 N.C. 541 (1880); State v. Lane, 78 N.C.
547 (1878).
" See note 18 supra.
20 See note 18 supra.
"N.C. CowsoL. STATS. § 4649 (1919); Revisal of 1905 § 3276; Code of
1883, § 1237. The attempt seems to have been made to write the 1883 case
law into statutory form.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 701, which added N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
179(5), (6) (1953).
" The original enactment N.C. Code of 1883, § 1237 read: "APPEAL BY
STATE; IN WHAT CASES RECOGNIZED. An appeal to the supreme court may
be taken by the state in the following cases, and no other. Where judgment
has been given for the defendant.
(1) Upon a special verdict;
(2) Upon a demurrer;
[Vol. 42
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§ 15-179. When State mzy Appeal.-An appeal to the Supreme
Court or Superior Court may be taken by the State in the follow-
ing cases, and no other. Where judgment has been given for the
defendant-
1. Upon a special verdict.
2. Upon a demurrer.
3. Upon a motion to quash.
4. Upon arrest of judgment.
5. Upon a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence, but only on questions of law.
6. Upon declaring a statute unconstitutional. 24
In these situations the State cannot alter facts to secure a con-
viction. On appeal from a sustained demurrer or motion to quash,
the case never has gone to trial on its merits; therefore, no facts have
been recorded. On special verdicts and arrests of judgment the
facts are decided by a jury and cannot be reviewed. Such appeals
as these include only questions of law.25 For this reason North
Carolina has, by section 15-179, expanded certain rights of the
State in an effort to secure judicial advantages.
A study of the cases interpreting the statute reveals that there
is some degree of uncertainty in both definition and application of
the statutory language. This uncertainty frequently results in er-
rors which might have been avoided if more specific provisions had
been formulated. In an attempt to clarify much of the confusion
caused by the absence of legislative definitions, the following interpre-
tations of the various subsections are offered along with discussions
of the important cases.
A. The Special Verdict
A special verdict28 is one in which the jury finds all the facts of
the case and refers the decision of the cause upon those facts to the
court.27 It is a verdict of guilty or not guilty since the facts found
(3) Upon a motion to quash;(4) Upon arrest of judgment."
'N.C. GEr. STAT. § 15-179 (1953).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(5), is expressly limited to questions of law.
Section 15-179(6), would evade factual questions since the constitutionality
of a statute is implicitly a question of law.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(1) (1953), allows appeal by the State upon
a special verdict in favor of the defendant.
"See Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. 423 (1867). However, a special
verdict differs from findings in answer to interrogatories. A finding on
interrogatories need not cover all material issues and accompanies a general
verdict. A special verdict must cover all facts and is given in place of a
general verdict. State v. Hanner, 143 N.C. 632, 57 S.E. 154 (1907).
19641
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by the jury "do or do not constitute in the law the offenses
charged."28 A judgment on a special verdict, since it involves only
matters of law, is open to review at the instigation of either the
defendant or the State.
The special verdict has several advantages in criminal cases. It
simplifies the charge which the judge must give to the jury since
there is no need to relate the law to the facts and it partially eliminates
the element of sentiment in jury decisions-.29  It presumes the cor-
rect application of the law to the facts because this is done by the
judge. By allowing the State to appeal the defendant cannot be said
to be in double jeopardy.- The facts are found, recorded, and can-
not be altered. Only the application of the law by the judge may be
examined.
A special verdict is open to review by a higher court, but when
the judge sets aside a verdict, as may be done, he cannot on his own
motion enter a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. In State v:
Moore"0 the defendant was indicted for larceny of two barrels of
turpentine. After the presentation of the evidence the jury was
asked to return a special verdict. Instead it answered with two
interrogatories of its own: If the court found turpentine to be the
subject matter of larceny and if the court found the defendant did
steal two barrels, then it, the jury, found the defendant guilty., The
judge entered a verdict of not guilty and the State appealed upon
the questions raised in the "special verdict." The appellate court
refused to answer the questions on the ground that the jury verdict
had been set aside, the judge replacing it with his own. The verdict
was not given by the jury and therefore it was a nullity.
In Moore the court allowed the appeal for the purpose of recog-
nizing the error of law which the trial judge had committed.
The judge had made his own determination as to the proof of the
allegation of larceny of two barrels of turpentine. This determina-
tion caused the "verdict" to be of a different nature from the find-
ings of the jury. The judge's .verdict was general and therefore
2 State v. Moore, 29 N.C. 228, 230 (1847).
"It was once necessary that the judge, upon considering the finding of
fact by the jury, instruct them as to his application of the law and require
that the jury itself render the actual verdict upon his instructions. This is
no longer a necessity, even though it is still acceptable. It is now sufficient
if the trial judge simply hears the facts found by the jury and orders hisjudgment entered on the record. For an excellent note on this and related
subjects see 13 N.C.L. REv. 321 (1935).
"29 N.C. 228 (1847).
[Vol. 42
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prohibited consideration of the legal questions on appeal by the
State. The court, however, realized that it was bound to act on the
appeal in some manner. It held that in such cases as these a mistrial
is to be declared and a venire de novo ordered in the court below.81
If the jury simply neglects to decide determinative facts and the
judge renders a special verdict in the proper form, the verdict is
ineffective, but the appeal is allowed on the question of law decided
by the judge. In State v. GulledgeO the defendant was found guilty
on "special verdict." The trial judge, on his own motion, ruled the
defendant not guilty. The State appealed on the theory that there
had been a special verdict. It was found that the facts determined
by the jury were insufficient to adjudicate either innocence or guilt.
Even though there could not have been a: binding verdict if the judge
had let the jury decision stand, the court held that the special verdict
would support an appeal by the State.3
Under section 15-179 the State may appeal to the superior court
from the various lower courts. Thus, the question arises whether
lower courts can render special verdicts. If 'the statute establishing
the lower court so specifies, special verdicts can be rendered.34  In
those courts where such authority is not granted in the establishing
act the power to issue special verdicts is undetermined. 35 If the
lower court had the authority to sit with a jury in criminal pro-
29 N.C. at 231.207 N.C. 374, 177 S.E. 128 (1934).
"This is not to say that where a judge sits without a jury he may call
his verdict a "special verdict" and thereby grant the State an appeal. Such
a verdict as this would be nothing more than an acquittal on a general verdict.
State v. Nichols, 215 N.C. 80, 200 S.E. 926 (1938). See also State v.
Mitchell, 225 N.C. 42, 33 S.E.2d 134 (1945), where the trial judge, upon
hearing the facts as determined by the jury, decided the applicable statute
was unconstitutional and ordered a "special verdict" on that ground. The
solicitor appealed on the theory that there had been a special verdict. The
appeal was not allowed on the ground that the constitutionality was a matter
which the judge could decide at any time; therefore, the verdict was not
based on the jury's findings, and no special verdict was given.
" State v. Mallett, 125 N.C. 718, 34 S.E. 651 (1899) ; State v. Bost, 125
N.C. 707, 34 S.E. 650 (1899).
" The supreme court announced its own uncertainty in State v. Everett,
244 N.C. 596, 94 S.E.2d 576 (1956), when it said: "Before the 1945 amend-
ment.., the State had no right of appeal to the Superior Court from thejudgment of an inferior court of competent jurisdiction given for the
defendant upon a special verdict.... The 1945 amendment implies that
there may be circumstances under which the State has such right of appeal.
Quaere: Unless the statute under which a recorder's court is established so
provides, may the judge of such court return a special verdict?" [Dismissed
on other grounds.] Id. at 597, 94 S.E.2d at 577.
19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ceedings, the implication is that there could be a special verdict
rendered. This implication is raised by both the history of special
verdicts in this State38 and the language of section 15-179 itself
which in no way limits the use of the special verdict. On the other
hand, if the inferior court is forbidden to use the jury, the judge
could not render a special verdict, and if he attempted to do so, the
judgment would be construed as a general verdict.3 7
B. The Demurrer
Subsection 15-179(2) contemplates a common law demurrer
to the indictment.38 Such a demurrer admits the facts as stated in
the indictment but attacks their legal effect. 9  Consequently, it pre-
sents only questions of law which are appealable by the State.
40
On demurrer facts are never presented to the jury for consideration.
Any evidence taken on the demurrer is considered by the judge and
goes to the question of the validity of the trial to be had, not to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.41
The State may appeal the sustaining of a demurrer, but the de-
fendant may not appeal if the demurrer is overruled. This is be-
cause sustaining such a demurrer amounts to a final judgment,
whereas if the demurrer of the defendant is overruled, it is in the
form of an interlocutory judgment which cannot be appealed.42
The defendant, however, may hold his exception, but he must pro-
ceed with the trial.
There is a possibility of confusion as to the breadth of the
appellate power given under subsection 15-179(2). Section 15-173
apparently provides for a motion called a "demurrer to the evi-
dence," 4 but this motion could not be within the purview of subsec-
tion 15-179(2). Historically, the State has never appealed after a
" Notice the use of the special verdict in Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N.C. 11,
156 S.E. 130 (1930); State v. Crawford, 198 N.C. 522, 152 S.E. 504
(1930); State v. Corpening, 191 N.C. 751, 133 S.E. 14 (1926).
" See note 33 supra.
8 See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
" State v. Edwards, 190 N.C. 322, 130 S.E. 10 (1925).
"O See State v. Harris, 106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E. 377 (1890).
41 State v. McDowell, 84 N.C. 798 (1881).
4' See State v. Blades, 209 N.C. 56, 182 S.E. 714 (1935) ; State v. Harris,
106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E. 377 (1890); State v. McDowell, 84 N.C. 798 (1881);
State v. Fishblate, 83 N.C. 654 (1880); State v. Bailey, 65 N.C. 426 (1871).
48 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (1953) is entitled "Demurrer to the Evi-
dence" and provides, in part: "the defendant may move to dismiss the
action, or for judgment as in the case of nonsuit."
[Vol. 42
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demurrer to the evidence,44 but there is a more valid reason. Section
15-173 when originally enacted in 1913 was captioned by the
Assembly as "an act to provide for judgment of nonsuit in criminal
actions."45  The misnomer of "demurrer to the evidence" was in-
serted as a title to the section by the publisher in 1919 in the cone-
solidated statutes.46 When minor amendments were made in 1951
the Assembly again referred to the amendment as one to amend
the section relating to motions to dismiss or judgments of nonsuit
in criminal actions.41 The subtitle "demurrer to the evidence" which
had been entered by the publisher was merely carried over by the
legislature, obviously without realizing that it was perpetrating a
previous editorial error. The section itself makes no mention of a
demurrer to the evidence, but mentions only motions to dismiss and
nonsuits4 It is evident that the legislature did not mean to grant,
by section 15-173, any form of demurrer which would be within the
authority granted in section 15-179 (2).
Demurrers to the indictment usually attack the allegations on the
theory that they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a criminal
offense, and most of the reported cases in North Carolina were ap-
pealed from demurrers sustained on that ground.49  However, it is
entirely possible that an indictment may be defective for other
reasons. In State v. Harris"5 the defendant had demurred on the
ground that there were "several counts charging distinct offenses,
but of the same grade and punishable alike.", 1 This was apparently
"The only cases which have been appealed under N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15-179(2) are State v. Truitt, 239 N.C. 590, 80 S.E.2d 637 (1954); State
v. Stewart, 239 N.C. 589, 80 S.E.2d 636 (1954); State v. Felton, 239 N.C.
575, 80 S.E.2d 625 (1954); State v. Parker, 209 N.C. 32, 182 S.E. 723(1935) ; State v. Morris, 208 N.C. 44, 179 S.E. 19 (1935) ; State v. Edwards,
190 N.C. 322, 130 S.E. 10 (1925); State v. Harris, 106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E.
377 (1890). These cases have all been appealed on common law demurrers
which were sustained. There has never been an appeal under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-179(2) on a "demurrer to the evidence" mentioned in the caption
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (1953).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 73.
"N.C. CoNsoL. STATS. § 4643 (1919).
'
7 N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 1086.
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (1953).
"See State v. Truitt, 239 N.C. 590, 80 S.E.2d 637 (1954); State v.
Stewart, 239 N.C. 589, 80 S.E.2d 636 (1954); State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575,
80 S.E.2d 625 (1954) ; State v. Parker, 209 N.C. 32, 182 S.E. 723 (1935) ;
State v. Morris, 208 N.C. 44, 179 S.E. 19 (1935); State v. Edwards, 190
N.C. 322,130 S.E. 10 (1925).
106 N.C. 682, 11 S.E. 377 (1890).106 N.C. at 687, 11 S.E. at 378.
19641
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a demurrer for misjoinder of criminal offenses even though the facts
alleged constituted the various crimes. The court held the demurrer
valid and allowed the State to appeal under subsection 15-179(2).
The trial judge may use his discretion in considering a demurrer,
but upon granting it he must leave the parties in their present situa-
tion. When a judge sustains a demurrer and returns a "verdict of
not guilty" thereon, the State may appeal upon a showing that the
"verdict" was, in fact, based on demurrer. "2 Thus, if the State
can procure another indictment, it has the right to do so.
C. The Motion to Quash
At common law the motion to quash was allowed against any in-
dictment insufficient on its face, 53 whether the insufficiency was
material or de minimus in form." In North Carolina the use of the
quashal is more restricted. There have been statutory modifications
which limit the right of the defendant to make a motion to quash so
that no quashal is allowed if "sufficient matter appears in the indict-
ment to enable the court to proceed to judgment."5 Also eliminated
is the requirement of legal words of art such as "with force of arms"
and "against the form of the statute."' 8
Most jurisdictions allow the motion to quash only where the
insufficiency is apparent on the face of the indictment. 7 North
Carolina, however, allows the defendant to make motions in those
cases where "relevant facts exist dehors the record" and can be
proven.58 It has been said that the trial court is allowed on its own
motion to require a quashal in those cases where it is apparent the
court has no authority."
"See State v. Parker, 209 N.C. 32, 182 S.E. 732 (1935), where the
defendant was the father of an illegitimate child born before the bastardy
act was passed. He was tried under the act. He demurred and the judge
held him not guilty. The State appealed. The court, on appeal, reversed
the trial judge even though "this could not be done upon a demurrer." Id.
at 33, 182 S.E. at 733.
" CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 416-21 (1918).
" People v. Cooper, 366 Ill. 113, 7 N.E.2d 882 (1937).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-153 (1953).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-155 (1953).
'¢ See Clark, op. cit. supra note 53, at 416-21 (1918).
"State v. Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 455, 59 S.E. 74, 76 (1907): "While
it is held in many jurisdictions that a motion to quash can only be made for
matter apparent in the record... it is otherwise with us. And a plea of the
kind interposed here has been sanctioned as a proper method, in motions
to quash, by which the relevant facts exist dehors the record should be made
to appear."
" The court explained the duties of the lower courts in State v. Miller,
[Vol. 42
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The motion to quash is, in form, a motion and not a plea and
it should be allowed for all material errors surrounding the pro-
ceedings. Some of the reasons for which indictments have been
quashed in North Carolina and which have supported appeal by the
State are: unconstitutionality of the statute on which the indictment
was drawn ° and "no evidence" on which the grand jury could find
an indictment. 61
There have been several cases that have taxed the court's ability
to define quashal for the purpose of the State's appeal, due to the
fact that North Carolina allows facts dehors the record in such
cases.6 2 The "dehors rule," since it allows an introduction of facts,
seems to produce difficulty in deciding when double jeopardy is in-
volved in quashal decisions. In State v. Bowman6 3 the State ap-
pealed a judgment for the defendant which had been granted on a
plea of statutory immunity. The defendant contended that the
State had no right to appeal under the immunity statute. The court
answered that for "the purpose of the appeal," the defendant's plea
should be considered as a motion to quash and brought within the
provisions of subsection 15-179 (3).64 The court reached a different
result, however, in State v. Wilson6 5 where the prisoner pleaded that
the indictment was issued for an offense for which he had previously
been tried. The trial judge allowed the "motion to quash" and
100 N.C. 543, 5 S.E. 925 (1888), where it said: "Generally and ordinarily,
a motion to quash the indictment made by the defendant, should not be
allowed, if made after the plea of not guilty, but such motion, on the part
of the State, may be allowed at any time before the defendant has been
actually tried upon the indictment. It seems, however, that the court has
authority, to be exercised in its discretion, to allow the motion to be made
by the defendant after his plea of not guilty, and there are cases in which
such motion should be allowed at any time, as when it appears from the
indictment that the court has no jurisdiction. This objection may, be taken
by mere suggestion, or by motion, or the Court may ex mero motu, take notice
of it. Neither consent nor waiver can give jurisdiction, and the court will not
proceed when it appears from the record that it has no authority." Id. at
545, 5 S.E. at 926.
"See State v. Wilkes, 233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951), where the
statute authorizing a fine for violation of parking meters was contested,
but no decision was made on the validity of the act since the action was
brought in the superior court which did not have jurisdiction. See also
State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961).
" State v. Barnes, 52 N.C. 20 (1859).
"E.g., State v. Wilson, 234 N.C. 552, 67 S.E.2d 748 (1951); State v.
Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 59 S.E. 74 (1907).
"145 N.C. 452, 59 S.E. 74 (1907).
"145 N.C. at 455, 59 S.E. at 75.
"234 N.C. 552, 67 S.E.2d 748 (1951).
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released the prisoner. The State appealed. The supreme court
refused to hear the appeal on the ground that this was not a granting
of a motion to quash but was a plea of autrefois acquit.
There is a legal distinction between the defenses used in Bowman
and Wilson. The accused is claiming prior jeopardy if his defense
rests on autrefois acquit, while a plea of immunity supports no such
allegation. However, the differentiation of these defenses for the
purpose of subsection 15-179(3) is not convincing. In both Bow-
man and Wilson the court allowed evidence dehors the record. These
"outside" facts do not go to the merits of the defendant's case and
cannot raise the issue of jeopardy. They deal with the validity of
the proposed trial. Both motions attempt to avoid the entire trial,
not the allegations in the indictment.66 If the plea of prior acquittal
is denied on appeal, then it becomes a legal conclusion that a con-
tinuation of the present proceedings would not constitute double
jeopardy. A review of the plea of immunity would involve the legal
construction of the immunity statute and not extraneous facts.
Consequently, both these defenses, pleaded in bar to the entire pro-
ceedings or in abatement of the indictment on extraneous facts,
should be included under motions to quash. 7
The court has, on occasion, shown leniency in its consideration
of quashals. In the case of State v. Wilkes6 the defendant was tried
for parking meter violations. He made a motion to quash on the
ground that the statute was unconstitutional. The motion was
sustained. On appeal by the State, the court avoided the question of
the statute's constitutionality and held instead that the trial court
had lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Consequently, the quashal
was allowed to stand even though the question of jurisdiction had
not been raised by the defendant's motion in the trial court. Thus,
while the State may appeal the granting of the motion and have its
contentions sustained, it may nevertheless lose the case if another
ground can be found on which the quashal could have been based.
The effect is that the State must not only prepare an appellate brief
on the specific grounds used in the lower court, but on any grounds
which should have been pleaded by the defendant.
" State v. Cooke, 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958).
" State v. Pararore, 146 N.C. 604, 60 S.E. 502 (1908).
233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951).
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D. The Arrest of Judgment
A motion in arrest of judgment is one made after verdict to
prevent entry of judgment. 9 It is based upon an insufficiency in
the indictment or a fatal defect appearing on the face of the record.7"
Oddly, North Carolina allows facts dehors the record to promote
quashals, 7' but does not allow them when a motion in arrest of
judgment is made.72 It is true that in the case of quashals the in-
sufficiency of the indictment to support a verdict is recognized
either before or during the trial, while in motions to arrest this in-
sufficiency is noted after a verdict has been rendered; however, this
distinction does not seem meaningful, and the legal effect of both
is the same.73
The constitutionality of a criminal statute may be questioned by
several methods during a trial. The demurrer,74 the motion to
quash,71 and the motion to arrest judgment78 are all available for
this purpose. It may be desirable, however, for a trial judge to
postpone decisions on constitutional issues until all the evidence has
been presented and the jury has returned a verdict. If the jury finds
the defendant guilty and the judge allows a motion to arrest because
of the constitutional question and is reversed on appeal, there would
be no need for a new trial.
The case of State v. McCollum77 poses an interesting problem
in the use of the motion to arrest. The defendant was convicted of
manslaughter and was ordered to pay the mother of his victim the
sum of six dollars per week for five years. The mother passed away
within a year, and the defendant petitioned the court to be relieved
" Appeal was allowed in State v. Hall, 183 N.C. 806, 112 S.E. 431 (1922),
though the court noted the following insufficiency: "It was not correct to
charge the jury that both parties could not be guilty of manslaughter, and thejury having convicted both, it was in the power of the court to have set aside
the verdict as to Haney, but it did not do so. On the contrary, the record
states that he arrested the judgment upon the verdict as to Haney as a matter
of law and the State, under the statute, had the right to appeal. C.S.,
4649(4) provides that the State may appeal 'where judgment is given for
the defendant upon arrest of judgment.'" Id. at 813, 112 S.E. at 435.
70 State v. McCollum, 216 N.C. 737, 739, 6 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1940).
71 See Part IL C, supra.
72 State v. Walker, 87 N.C. 541 (1882).
" Both are based on the premise that the judgment cannot lie because of
some legal defect. It ought to be unimportant whether these defects are
apparent on the record 6r dehors the record.
' State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).
State v. Wilkes, 233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951).
' State v. Hall, 183 N.C. 806, 112 S.E. 431 (1922).
216 N.C. 737, 6 S.E.2d 503 (1940).
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of further payments, whereupon the victim's father asked to have
them continued. The judge authorized the discontinuance of further
payments and the State appealed on the basis that there had been
an "arrest of judgment" since the payments were halted. The
supreme court denied the State's appeal on the ground that this was
not an arrest of judgment of "ordinary legal significance, '78 and
that therefore the appeal could not lie under subsection 15-179(4).
In refusing the appeal of the State, the court failed to mention any
right of the father to appeal. Although the father was not asking
review he should have such a right in these cases.70  The interven-
tion of the father should be construed to change the character of the
criminal action to that of a civil suit for enforcement of a money
judgment and such controversies are appealable by the intervenor.
E. The Motion for a New Trial on Newly Discovered Evidence-
The Constitutionality of a Statute
Subsections 15-179(5) and (6) were enacted in 1945" to over-
rule two cases which had been decided by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, and it is necessary to examine the holding and effect
of the individual decisions in order to determine their intended scope.
Prior to 1945 neither the defendant nor the State could appeal
from the ruling of the judge on a motion to grant a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.8 2 This determination by the
judge was considered to involve no matter of law or legal inference. 83
It was reasoned that the State had obtained its conviction and that
if the defendant wanted to reopen the issues, it was within the
76216 N.C. at 739, 6 S.E.2d at 504.
' The court at one point infers such a right when it distinguishes the
State's argument by stating: "The cases cited by appellant [State] are not
in point. In S. v. Beatty, 66 N.C., 648, a bastardy case under the law then
in force, the appeal was taken by the relator; and in S. v. Parsons, 115 N.C.,
730, 20 S.E., 511, another bastardy case, the prosecutrix appealed." 216
N.C. at 739, 6 S.E.2d at 504.
" Decisions from all civil suits between private parties are appealable
since double jeopar-ty does not apply to civil actions. State v. Watson, 209
N.C. 229, 231, 183 S.E. 286, 287 (1936).
61 N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 701.
6" State v. Moore, 202 N.C. 841, 163 S.E. 700 (1932); State v. Griffin,
202 N.C. 517, 163 S.E. 457 (1932); State v. Cox, 202 N.C. 378, 162 S.E.
907 (1932),8' Griffin and Cox both held that the granting or denial of a motion for
new trial on new evidence was in the trial judge's discretion. Griffin went
further and said that the reason such action was not appealable was because
it involved no matter of law or legal inference. 202 N.C. at 518, 163 S.E.
at 457.
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judge's discretion to let him do so. 4 The judge's order allowing
the motion, when made in a criminal action, is conclusive on the
State.85 The epitomy of this logic was brought out in State v.
Todd.s  The defendant had been convicted of murder and asked
for a new trial to consider newly discovered evidence. The judge
allowed the motion and the State appealed 7 on the question of
whether the evidence which defendant presented was within the
legal definition of "newly discovered evidence."" The court in
refusing to consider the appeal said issues of this type were within
the "and no other" part of section 15-179 and thereby prohibited. 9
State v. Todd precipitated the enactment of subsection 15-
179 (5) 90 which allows appeal by the State on a motion for a new trial
by the defendant. There is little need to refuse the State such a
right in these cases. The questions presented on motions for new
trial on new evidence do not of themselves involve double jeopardy.
The questions on such motion go only to the character of the "new
evidence." The holding in Todd refusing the appeal subjected the
State to the rigors of a new trial when there were valid legal
questions concerning the validity of the new evidence. The court
missed the opportunity to clarify legal issues which might have
reduced future litigation.
On the motions for new trial it is the defendant, not the solicitor,
who is asking for another trial on the merits of his new evidence.
64 State v. Griffin, 202 N.C. 517, 518, 163 S.E. 457 (1932).
8 State v. Cox, 202 N.C. 378, 380, 162 S.E. 907, 909 (1932).
224 N.C. 776, 32 S.E.2d 313 (1944).
8, The State also sought certiorari. In refusing to consider the case the
court refused to grant certiorari in its supervisory capacity. Note that
certiorari is implicitly limited to those cases where the State could have
appealed, but the right of appeal has been lost in some way.
" In State v. Casey, 201 N.C. 620, 161 S.E. 81 (1931), the court outlined
the prerequisites to the granting of new trials on newly discovered evidence.
It was held that it must appear: "1. That the witness or witnesses will give
the newly discovered evidence.... 2. That such newly discovered evidence
is probably true.... 3. That it is competent, material and relevant.... 4.
That due diligence was used and proper means were employed to procure
the testimony at trial.... 5. That the newly discovered evidence is not
merely cumulative... 6. That it does not tend only to contradict a former
witness or to impeach or discredit him.... 7. That it is of such a nature
as to show that on another trial a different result will probably be reached
and that the right will prevail." Id. at 624-25, 161 S.E. at 83-84.
It was also stated in Casey that new trials on newly discovered evidence
could only be granted in the superior court and never in the supreme court
in criminal cases. Id. at 625, 161 S.E. at 84.89 State v. Todd, 224 N.C. 776, 777, 32 S.E.2d 313 (1944).
o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(5) (1953).
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If the defendant has valid evidence it would be logical to grant his
motion; however, if such evidence is legally invalid it could do him
no harm to have the State appeal on that issue prior to the proposed
new trial.
The right of appeal from judgments declaring a statute un-
constitutional has a different history. Defendants had always had
the power to contest the validity of statutes in many ways. Statutes
had been tested by demurrer, quashals and arrests of judgment.01
All of these methods were in use prior to 1945, and an appeal by the
State was allowed in every case.92  But in 1945 a constitutional
question was presented in the case of State v. Mitchell. 3 The de-
fendant was indicted for practicing palmistry. His defense was the
invalidity of the act under which he was being tried. The jury
returned a "special verdict" holding the defendant not guilty because
the statute was prohibited by the constitution." The State appealed
the verdict on the theory that it was returned on the special verdict.
The supreme court, however, found the verdict was based, not on
the facts found, but on the judge's conclusion that the statute was
invalid. The court reasoned that the judge could rule on statutory
validity at any time during the trial; therefore, the special verdict,
as such, was without effect.95 With the statutory ground for appeal,
the special verdict, eliminated the court held that there was nothing
on which the State could support its appeal, and it was dismissed.
The Mitchell case was apparently the first decision which refused
appeal by the State where a statute had been declared invalid." This
prompted the legislature to enact subsection 15-179(6)OT granting
appeal in all such cases. Appeals on statutory validity are now al-
"' See notes 74, 75, 76 supra.
"E.g., Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N.C. 11, 156 S.E. 130 (1930); State v.
Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 140 S.E. 216 (1927); State v. Corpening, 191 N.C.
751, 133 S.E. 14 (1926); State v. Jones, 191 N.C. 371, 131 S.E. 734 (1926).
- 225 N.C. 42, 33 S.E.2d 134 (1945).
",N.C. CoNsT. art. II, § 29.
95 225 N.C. at 42, 33 S.E.2d at 134-35.
"The decision of the court in Mitchell was faulty in that it went only
halfway. The court correctly recognized that the judge had ruled on his
own motion to determine the validity of the act. The court, however, failed
to recognize that this motion must have had some nature of its own, even
though made by the judge. It must have had some substantive basis such as
an arrest of judgment (as apparently used in Mitchell) or quashal. Testing
constitutionality is only the object of the motion, it is not in itself a motion.
Using this logic the court could have brought the State's right to appeal
within N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179, as it then stood.
"IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179(6) (1953).
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lowed indirectly under most subsections of section 15-17995 and
specifically by subsection 15-179(6). The problem of appellate
authority present in Todd is no longer a consideration. 9
III. CERTIORARI
The North Carolina Constitution grants the supreme court the
"power to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a general
supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts."' °
The power to use remedial writs, such as the writ of certiorari, in
any type of lower court action has presented problems as it applies
to the State's power to appeal. If certiorari can be used by the State
when it does not have a right of appeal, its use would be in derogation
of section 15-179. If the use of a writ of certiorari is allowed only
where the State has lost its appellate power it could be regarded as
detrimental to the defendant. Yet, the authority for the use of the
writ is stated in the constitution and it must have some accepted
application.
This conflict was realized early in our judicial history. In State
v. SwepsonY" the trial judge refused to amend the record to show
that the State had not waived the appearance of the defendant at
trial. The State asked for a writ of certiorari to have the record
amended. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ 0 2
on the theory that it was within the supervisory powers of the court
to amend the record when the trial judge had abused his discretion.
However, the court recognized the possibility that the State might
avoid statutory limitations if the writ was available without limita-
tion and in order to narrow its use the court laid down basic guide-
lines.0 3 The supreme court reserved the right to issue any remedial
writs in exercising its supervisory power, but limited itself in grant-
ing certiorari to the State in the following language: "[T]he right
[of appeal] in the case of the State is... restricted... to errors of
law on the face of judgments adverse to the State, on demurrer to
the indictment, or on motion to quash or in arrest, or on a special
' See State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961) ; State v. Wilkes,
233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951); State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C.
664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).
"But see State v. Wilkes, 233 N. C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951).
" N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
1-0 83 N.C. 584 (1880).
10' In Swepson the court granted a writ of error, but took the opportunity
to outline the limits within which a writ of certiorari could be granted.10 83 N.C. at 586.
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verdict.... And in case of appeal lost without laches... the State
in the instances aforesaid, may have a writ of certiorari... as a
substitute for an appeal."'' 4 Thus, the State can obtain certiorari
only in those cases in which it has previously had a right of appeal
and has lost that right without laches.
There was no indication in Swepson that writs of certiorari
could only be granted where the error was apparent on the face of
the record. Indeed, in that case, the error complained of was that
certain information had been omitted from the record. But in
State v. Todd,-0 5 it is stated that the error must appear on the trial
record in order to be corrected by the court on certiorari.
The use of the writ of certiorari is well established in North
Carolina. However, a change would be in order to put the law into
perspective. The language of the constitution grants the court a
complete power to issue any remedial writ in its supervisory ca-
pacity.' O8 The court, on its own motion, as seen from the above
discussion, has undertaken to limit the use of this power. Neverthe-
less, the power of the'court to grant unlimited review through the
use of supervisory writs remains and can only be irrevocably limited
by an amendment. 10 7
IV. THE GENERAL VERDICT
A general verdict may be rendered by a judge or a jury, upon
consideration of the facts and law presented at trial.' When the
accused has been tried and acquitted on a general verdict the result
is final and conclusive, and no appeal is allowed the State.1°0 These
findings are not appealable because the verdict declares that the facts
essential to establish the defendant's guilt were not proven on the
merits of the evidence. An appeal on a general verdict would neces-
sarily put before the appellate court questions of fact. If the court
20' Ibid.
"0 224 N.C. 776, 777, 32 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1944).
"'
0N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
'"
7An amendment would not be necessary for the supreme court to grant
review in those cases where the error does not appear on the record. Under
the power to issue any supervisory writs, the court could review errors on as
well as dehors the record. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
10. Some jurisdictions have held that only a jury can render a general
verdict. See Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N.E. 875 (1924). But
North Carolina has held that a judge sitting without a jury can render only
a general verdict. State v. Nichols, 215 N.C. 80, 200 S.E.2d 926 (1939).
In comparison, a special verdict rests on a finding by the jury of facts only.
See note 27 supra.E.g., State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882).
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were allowed to review general verdicts, it would have the ability to
redetermine factual issues. This would put the accused in double
jeopardy.
If there has not been a general verdict, there may be a right of
appeal under section 15-179." ° In order to bar the appeal it must be
determined that there has in fact been a general verdict and that the
verdict constituted an acquittal. The verdict, to be general, should
be given by a body which has considered the issues of both law and
fact. The acquittal which is rendered must be a finding of not
guilty and must rest on the merits.1
The rule that the State cannot appeal from general verdicts
has been stated in many North Carolina decisions. 12 The leading
case is State v. Savery"3 which involved issues dealing with a
"general verdict" on a warrant charging a misdemeanor. In Savery
the jury was impaneled and the first witness sworn. This witness
was the prosecutor who testified that even though the warrant did
not contain an affidavit, he was the witness who was mentioned there-
in. On realizing the warrant contained no affidavit the defendant
moved for a "verdict of not guilty." The State asked that the case
be heard on its merits or that the warrant be dismissed with leave to
the State to retry the defendant. The judge denied the State's
objection and instructed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty for
the defendant. From this verdict the State appealed.
On appeal the majority were of the opinion that a general verdict
had been entered and there could be no appeal. Their opinion turned
on three essential issues. First, the court found that the rule of
110 The statute is a restrictive statute. This created an innocuous situation
in the early days of its enactment. The supreme court had said that since
the statute granted an appeal only to that court, the State could only appeal
from a lower court to the superior courts in those circumstances in which it
was specifically provided by the act creating the lower courts. State v. Bost,
125 N.C. 707, 34 S.E. 650 (1899). The act establishing the eastern district
courts allowed appeal to the superior courts but such power was inadvertently
omitted from the act creating the western district courts. State v. Mallette,
125 N.C. 718, 34 S.E. 651 (1899). This oddity was later removed by adding
the words "or Superior court" to the statute thereby bringing almost all
State appeals within the statute. See State v. Savery, 126 N.C. 1083, 36
S.E. 22 (1900).
...An acquittal in fact can never be rendered except upon the jury
verdict of not guilty. Acquittals in law are those which occur by operation
of law. State v. Walton, 186 N.C. 485, 119 S.E. 886 (1923).
.. E.g., State v. Moore, 84 N.C. 724 (1881); State v. Lane, 78 N.C. 547
(1878) ; State v. Taylor, 8 N.C. 462 (1821).
126 N.C. 1083, 36 S.E. 22 (1900).
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double jeopardy might apply in cases other than capital felonies. 4
Second, if double jeopardy was in issue, the impaneling of the jury
constituted primary jeopardy and any review would violate de-
fendant's constitutional rights."' Finally the court found that if
double jeopardy was not an issue there was no authority for setting
aside a general verdict of not guilty.
Two justices dissented." 6 Their reasoning avoided the issues
presented by the majority. Justice Montgomery, writing for the
dissent, surmised that there had not been a general verdict but rather
a quashal.17  He recognized that an acquittal, to be final and con-
clusive, must be had on a trial upon the merits of the case." 8 Since
the State had requested that the merits be presented and this request
had been refused because the warrant was not supported by an
affidavit, the action of the judge was in legal effect a quashal. Ap-
peals from quashals are allowed under subsection three of section
15-179.
The effect of the Savery decision is to allow the trial judge to
deny an appeal to the State by the simple use of terminology. By
making a ruling on the validity of an indictment and by calling that
ruling a general verdict the State is foreclosed from its appellate
power. In Savery the judge's attention was called to the indictment
not by defense counsel's motion to quash or to arrest judgment, but
by evidence submitted on trial by the prosecuting witness. Regard-
less of how the court became aware of the defective warrant the
legal effect of striking down that warrant should not be altered.
V. EXCEPTIONS TO N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179
There are several holdings which are of importance in a con-
sideration of section 15-179. Some of these rightly come under the
heading of "exceptions" because of their peculiar effect; others are
merely inconsistencies. An understanding of these cases, however,
aids in defining the area within which section 15-179 has effect.
1 126 N.C. at 1086, 36 S.E. at 23.
1r 126 N.C. at 1086-87, 36 S.E. at 23.
... 126 N.C. at 1091, 36 S.E. at 25.
117 126 N.C. at 1092-93, 36 S.E. at 25.
"
8 The conclusions of the dissent in Savery present the more accurate
view of the facts. The trial judge refused to hear evidence on the premise
that the indictment would not support a finding by the jury. It is difficult
to see how such a warrant could support a "general verdict of acquittal."
If the jury cannot return a verdict on the warrant and evidence, it cannot
reasonably be instructed to return a valid judicial "verdict" on the warrant
alone.
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The authority of section 15-179 has been challenged in a series
of decisions which defy explanation.119 In these cases the court has
recognized that there was no right of appeal on behalf of the State.
Then it has proceeded, either on its own motion or on request of
counsel, to discuss the issues involved and to make judicial decisions
which affect the rights of the accused.2 0 In these cases the possi-
bility of double jeopardy is a live issue, and the court has allowed the
defendant to be retried without deciding it. To continue this prac-
tice in the shadow of a statute1 21 which expressly prohibits such
activities is to circumvent the statute and give judicial sanction to
double jeopardy.
There are other cases which give the statute an effect in contrast
to some interpretations.2 The constitution provides that in a
justice's court "the party against whom the judgment is given may
appeal to the Superior Court, where the matter shall be heard
anew.'=m This language appears to give both the State and the ac-
cused the power to appeal, but the court has held that only the accused
may appeal. 24 Though obviously limiting the language of the
constitution, the decisions are based on sound reasoning. If the
State appeals from an adverse verdict on the facts and has the matter
heard de novo, it is putting the accused in double jeopardy. How-
ever, the clause should not be construed in a manner which limits all
119 See State v. Burnett, 173 N.C. 750, 91 S.E. 597 (1917); State v.
Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169 (1908); State v. Davidson, 124 N.C.
839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899) ; State v. Hinson, 123 N.C. 755, 31 S.E. 854 (1898);
State v. Lane, 78 N.C. 547 (1878).
1"' E.g., State v. Burnett, 173 N.C. 750, 91 S.E. 597 (1917), where the
court determined that there was no right of appeal but proceeded to answer
the question presented since it was important to the due administration of
law in the county courts and it was specially requested by counsel. The
question in cases of this sort is: What dispositions and actions can be taken
with regard to the decision on the "unappealable issue"? See State v.
Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169 (1908), where the court stated: "The
real difficulty present in the case here is whether the State had the right to
appeal. We think not. The statute now regulates this matter .... While,
therefore, error appears in the proceedings below, we cannot reverse the
action of the court, as we have no jurisdiction, by reason of the statute, to
do so, but we have considered the merits of the case to some extent, as they
were fully discussed before us and we were asked do so." Id. at 564, 63
S.E. at 171.
...The statute referred to is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1953).
"
2 E.g., State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882).
.
2 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 27.
12. See State v. Powell, 86 N.C. 640 (1882), which nullifies the constitu-
tional argument but goes on to say when part of a criminal judgment is
personal to the prosecuting witness and taxes him with costs, he may appeal
since the proceeding assumes the character of a civil controversy.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
appeals by the State, but only those which would prejudice the de-
fendant. An appeal on questions of law should be allowed. The
clear language of the constitution should prevail over the statute
which allows appeal in certain cases "and no other."' 25
Other decisions have influenced the interpretation of the statute
as it applies to "criminal" actions. 126 Double jeopardy applies only
in the criminal courts .2 Therefore, only actions brought under
criminal statutes are controlled by section 15-179. However, civil
statutes are also within the purview of section 15-179 if they pre-
scribe criminal punishments. 28 In such cases neither the State, if
it is a party, nor a plaintiff who is a private citizen may appeal an
adverse decision. It was held that to allow such appeal would con-
stitute double jeopardy.2 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The rights of the citizen and the State are actually two sides of
the same coin. The citizen has the right not to be persecuted or
convicted if he is not guilty of a criminal offense against the State.
The State has the right and duty to convict and punish those indi-
viduals who are guilty of criminal offenses. The major considera-
tion is the balancing of these rights on an equitable basis so that the
rights of the State and its citizens may be preserved. As was pointed
out earlier, various approaches have been taken in this balancing
...N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1953) provides: "An appeal... may be
taken by the State in the following cases, and no other...."
... E.g., State v. Ivie, 118 N.C. 1227, 24 S.E. 539 (1896) ; State v. Ostwalt,
118 N.C. 1208, 24 S.E. 660 (1896). See State v. Cox, 215 N.C. 458, 2 S.E.2d
370, aff'd 216 N.C. 424, 5 S.E.2d 125 (1939), where the defendant was tried
in the county court for illegal possession of gambling devices, he was found
guilty and served notice of appeal. The judge said that he would change the
judgment if the defendant would withdraw his appeal to the superior court;
this the defendant did. The superior court judge then said that either the
State or the defendant could appeal after the lower court granted a nwlo
contendere. The State appealed. The supreme court held that the superior
court judge could not enlarge the right of the State to appeal.State v. Watson, 209 N.C. 229, 183 S.E. 286 (1936).
12 State v. Ostwalt, 118 N.C. 1208, 24 S.E. 660 (1896). The defendant
was charged under the bastardy act which required that a fine be assessed.
The defendant was found not guilty and the mother appealed. The court
held that to allow the appeal would be to put the defendant in "double
jeopardy." Id. at 1216, 24 S.E. at 663. Thus the civil offense was converted
via the fine provision to a criminal offense. But see State v. Ivie, 118 N.C.
1227, 24 S.E. 539 (1896), where facts were the same but the lower court
had exceeded its jurisdiction in hearing the case and the appeal was allowed
to both the State and the prosecutrix.
"' See State v. Ostwalt, 118 N.C. 1208, 24 S.E. 660 (1896).
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process.180 Some jurisdictions have emphasized the citizen's right to
protection while others have given a free rein to the State to appeal
criminal cases.' 31 Many jurisdictions have derogated the common
law and have allowed some appeal by the State.'32 Just where that
appellate power should cease has been another question.
Perhaps the best approach to the problem is to allow appeals by
the State on all questions of law. 3 3 The law is the basis of our
society. It should contemplate its own best interest by providing
appeals which would help to clarify and protect it. If questions of
law are neglected when it could be to no one's harm to have them
answered, society as a whole is put at a disadvantage. Not only may
guilty individuals escape punishment but the citizenry must ride a
crest of consequential errors promulgated in the court system.
Appeals by the State on questions of law would by definition
exclude appeals from general verdicts. It would eliminate the
necessity for distinctions between special verdicts, demurrers, con-
stitutional questions and quashals. The courts could deal with legal
problems and avoid the formal distinctions. Such a practice would
pay dividends in efficient appellate procedure, definitive answers to
legal questions, and swifter and surer justice for all.
ARNOLD T. WooD
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual-Capital Punishment
The Supreme Court of the United States recently denied certio-
rari to consider whether the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment1 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty on a convicted rapist.2 However, Justice Goldberg, joined
by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented and favored granting
.. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
... Ibid. Various states have adopted differing approaches between the
extremes of no appellate power in the State and unlimited appellate power.
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 370 (1940) (Recomp. 1958), allowing appeals by
the State only when statutes are declared unconstitutional.
.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 370 (1940) (Recomp. 1958) ; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-96 (1958) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1953).
... Our own court has questioned such an omission from N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-179. See State v. Todd, 224 N.C. 776, 32 S.E.2d 313 (1944); State v.
Davidson, 124 N.C. 839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899).
'"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
' Rudolph v. Alabama, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3154 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1963).
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certiorari to consider whether capital punishment for rape was (1)
violative of the evolving standard of decency that marks the progress
of society, (2) punishment disproportionate to the offense, (3) un-
necessary cruelty since the aims of punishment may be achieved by
a less severe penalty than death.' The dissenting opinion supported
its reasons for raising these questions on various surveys and figures
showing the decline and ineffectiveness of the death penalty as punish-
ment for rape. The importance of the dissent lies in the possibility
that the Supreme Court might take judicial notice of such criteria
and consider the question of whether the death penalty, in light of
such notice, might be considered cruel and unusual punishment, not
merely for rape, but for all crime.
The latent ambiguities in the term "cruel and unusual" have made
it difficult for the courts to define its exact meaning.4 The clause
originated in the Magna CartaP and was included in the English
Bill of Rights of 16888 as a result of the atrocious conduct of the
Stuarts. It worked its way through several of the early American
state constitutions into the Federal Bill of Rights adopted in 1791.8
The early cases interpreted the sanction against cruel and unusual
punishment as placing a fixed standard on the inhuman methods
of punishment, prohibiting only those physical brutalities and
tortures which existed when it was adopted, such as burnings,
brandings, and disembowelings.9 However, in 1909 the Court in
8 Ibid.
"'Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent
of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted." Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36(1878).
'9 Hen. 3, c.14 (1225).
81 W. & M., c.2, I, § 10 (1689).
" "[Cruel and unusual punishment] .., is usually applied to punishments
which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the ironboot, the
stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute pain and
suffering. Such punishments were at one time inflicted in England, but
they were rendered impossible by the Declaration of Rights, adopted by
Parliament on the successful termination of the revolution of IT88, and
subsequently confirmed in the Bill of Rights of 1688." O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (dissenting opinion). See Notes, 41 N.C.L. REv.
244, 245 (1963); 4 VAND. L. REv. 680, 682 (1951).
'BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 16 (1964). [Hereinafter
cited as BEDAU.]
'O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 324 (1892); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). See also Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1909) (dissenting opinion). This early view
restricted the legislature from prescribing inhuman methods of punishment
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Weems v. United States" rejected the contention that the framers
intended merely "to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went
out of practice with the Stuarts" and stated that "the clause of the
Constitution ... is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane jus-
tice."" Thus the concept of cruel and unusual is no longer a static
restriction against early English barbarities in the modes of punish-
ment, but rather increases in its meaning as the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"' 2 increase.
This reinterpretation has expanded the eighth amendment in mean-
ing, scope and application.'
Although reluctant at first,'4 the Court seems to have definitely
decided that the eighth amendment is incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment by the due process clause and is applicable to the
states. 5 While the Court recognizes the power of the legislature to
prescribe the severity of punishment,'" it has declared that a punish-
but gave them full power to define the severity of punishment. See Note, 36
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 846, 847 (1961).
" 217 U.S. 349 (1909).11 Id. at 373. Justice McKenna went on further to state that "legislation,
both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience
of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily con-
fined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to
be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words
of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it."' Ibid.12Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957).
See Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846 (1961).
"The early decisions stated that the eighth amendment was only a
limitation on the federal government and did not apply to the states. It re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 324 (1892).
However, confusion began in Louisiana ex ret. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947), when the Court assumed but did not decide that the eighth
amendment applied to the states. It continued in Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d
250 (3rd. Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949),
leading one distinguished writer to the conclusion that, "while a categorical
statement that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment by a state has yet to be made by the Supreme Court, any judg-
ment to the contrary would be so shocking that its possibility appears
negligible." Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L.
REV. 271, 277 (1950).
' Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
'o "We disclaim the right to assert a judgment against that of the legisla-
ture of the expediency of the laws or the rights to oppose the judicial power
to the legislative power to define crimes and fix their punishment, unless that
power encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibition. In such a case
19641
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ment disproportionate to the offense may be cruel and unusual in the
same manner as inhuman methods of punishment."Y Cruel and un-
usual punishment is no longer limited merely to physical cruelties but
includes mental cruelty as well.' s When the purpose of a statute is
deemed to place a cruel punishment on those who violate it, the
Court may declare it unconstitutional.' 9 Thus it can readily be
seen that expansion of the definition of the eighth amendment has
broadened the area in which the judiciary can limit the legislature's
power to inflict punishment. When a punishment violates the
standard set by society, it is the duty of the court to declare it un-
constitutional."0 However, in order for the court to apply such an
elusive test as the evolving standards of decency that mark a civilized
society, judicial notice must be taken of the facts which are indica-
tive of a punishment's acceptance and necessity in that society. The
question arises whether the death penalty can now survive, or
whether society has evolved to that stage in civilization where it is
cruel and unusual.
The history of the death penalty found its origin in the Biblical
admonition that "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his
blood be shed."'" However, as time went on, capital punishment
failed to be so restricted. Between the fifteenth and nineteenth
centuries in England, the crimes punishable by death increased from
fifty to two hundred and thirty-three, which included "crimes of
every description against the state, against the person, against
property, [and] against the public peace.... "22  The earliest codifi-
cation of capital crimes in the United States, "The Capitall Laws of
New England," was enacted in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in
not our discretion but our legal duty, strictly defined and imperative in its
-direction, is invoked." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1909).
"' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909) (hard and painful labor
as punishment for falsifying public documents). In reaching his decision
Justice McKenna urged that a less severe punishment would suffice since
"the state suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of punishment
is fullfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting severity,
its repetition is prevented and hope is given for the reformation of the
criminal." Id. at 381.
18 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957). In declaring that denationaliza-
tion was cruel and unusual, Chief Justice Warren took judicial notice of the
fact that the civilized nations of the world were in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. Id. at 102-03.
"o Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (concurring opinion
of Justice Douglas). See Note, 41 N.C.L. REv. 244 (1963).
'0 See note 16 supra.
21 Genesis 9:6.
"BEDAU 2.
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1636 and listed thirteen offenses punishable by death. 3 Although
the use of capital punishment in the United States today has pro-
gressed over that of nineteenth century England, the effect of such
progress has been more evident in the methods used in administering
the death penalty than in the number of crimes punishable by it.24
However, the decline of the death penalty in the United States
cannot be recognized by reviewing the number of statutes that pre-
scribe it,25 or the number of jurisdictions that retain it.28 It is more
significant to note that in the actual disposition of capital cases, the
number of persons executed has been dropping steadily, while the
number of persons awaiting execution has been increasing. Where-
as the number of persons executed in England between 1805 and 1812
was two to three thousand,27 the number executed in the United
States between 1955 and 1962 was approximately four hundred and
fifty.2 s During the past decade, it is estimated that only, one out of
every ten persons convicted of first degree murder was executed.29
" Id. at 5. Among those included were: idolatry, W'itchcraft, blasphemy,
sodomy, buggery, adultry, and manstealing.
" "Probably few Americans have any idea just how many crimes still
carry a death penalty-anywhere from thirty-three to sixty-seven, de-
pending on how they are classified and counted. They range from the
familiar ones such as murder, kidnapping, rape, and treason, to such crimes
as desecrating a grave '(Georgia), attempting to set fire to a prison (Ar-
kansas), and sexual intercourse with a girl under eighteen, so called 'statutory
rape' (Nevada and Texas)." Id. at 32-33. There are four crimes punish-
able by death in North Carolina: arson, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1953) ;
burglary, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1953); murder, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(1953); rape, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953).
" "According to the National Prison Statistics there are only seven
capital crimes for which the death sentence has been carried out since 1930:
murder, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, espionage, burglary, and assault
by a life term prisoner. Thus, when one speaks about the volume of capital
crimes in the United States, one refers for all practices to the volume of
these seven crimes." BEDAU 57.
"6 The United States is made up of fifty-four jurisdictions-the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
federal government under both civil and military law. Of these fifty-four
jurisdictions, only six have totally abolished capital punishment-Alaska,
Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Puerto Rico, and Wisconsin. Three other states
have abolished it for all but certain crimes: Michigan (treason); Rhode
Island (murder by a life term convict); North Dakota (murder by a life
term convict serving a life term for murder). Ten states have abolished
the death penalty and then restored it. See BEDAU 12.2 7 Id. at 2.
18 Id. at 110-11. Since 1909 in North Carolina, there have been 275
executions for murder, 68 for rape, 11 for burglary, and 1 for arson-murder.
Letter from the North Carolina Parole Board, to Floyd McKissick, February
10, 1964, on file in the North Carolina Law Library.
20 BEDAu 36.
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In 1962, out of three hundred and seventy-two people sentenced to
death, forty-seven were executed, fifty-eight were disposed of by
other means,30 and two hundred and sixty-seven were awaiting
execution at the year's end." This reluctance of the courts to carry
out the death penalty leads one to the conclusion that capital punish-
ment in the United States today is "an anachronism, a vestigial sur-
vivor of an earlier era when the possibilities of an incarcerative and
rehabilitative penology were hardly imagined."
3 2
However, the judiciary does not seem to hold as high a regard
for human life in construing cruel and unusual punishment, as it does
in actually disposing of the death penalty. Thus far, cruel and
unusual "implies that there be something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." 3  The
Supreme Court has made the distinction that "punishments are cruel
when they involve torture, or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the Constitution."3 " According to this view, while death itself is
not cruel and unusual, the methods of inflicting it may be, if they
add unnecessary pain. 5 Thus, burning at the stake, crucifixion,
breaking at the wheel, or the like are cruel and unusual methods,"0
while hanging,3 7 electrocutionu lethal gas, 9 and shooting4 0 are
humane and progressive means to administer death. Other cases
offer the suggestion that as all punishment is in a sense cruel, the
cruelty inherent in the death penalty is sanctioned by the Constitu-
"oTwenty-seven received commutations, 4 were transported to a mental
hospital, while the other 27 received either reversals of judgments, vacated
sentences or grants for new trials. Id. at 108.
'
311d. at 106.
32 Id. at 31.8 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
* Ibid.
It re Storti, 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210 (1901).
"In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
", State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628, 190 N.W. 38 (1922) ; Dutton v. State,
123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914).
"In re Storti, 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210 (1901); State v. Tomasi, 75
N.J.L. 739, 69 AtI. 214 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908) ; People ex rel. Kemmler v.
Durston, 119 N.Y. 569, 24 N.E. 6, application for writ of error denied sub
torn., in re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131
Va. 726, 109 S.E. 582 (1921).
"Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934); People v.
Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953);
State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 Pac. 676 (1923).
"Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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tion since it is necessary for the protection of society.4" Although
it is conceded that the death penalty could be disproportionate to
the offense, the courts have failed to strike down capital statutes for
lower felonies,42 and in one case for a misdemeanor,4 3 usually under
the logic that such statutes do not shock the conscience of the com-
munity.44 Except for a recent dictum to the contrary,45 it is obvious
that the death penalty has been held constitutional under a narrow
and static interpretation of the eighth amendment. By applying the
"lingering death" rule, the courts are foreclosing the possibility that
death, as a mode of punishment, might become cruel and unusual,4
which in itself is contradictory to the evolving standard test accepted
by the contemporary judiciary. If the standards of society have
changed so that the death penalty is no longer acceptable to its ideas
of decency, then it seems capital punishment ought to be struck
down by judicial action.
Since the Supreme Court must view cruel and unusual punish-
ment in the light of an evolving standard, it is necessary for it to
take judicial notice of data relevant in determining that standard. 7
"Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914); State v. Tomasi,
75 N.J.L. 739, 69 Ati. 214 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908).
"2 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952) (conspiring to
espionage); Ex parte Wells, 35 Cal. 2d 889, 221 P.2d 947 (1950) (assault
by a person serving a life term); People v. Tanner, 3 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d
324 (1935) (kidnapping); People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733, 106 Pac.
74 (1910) (assault with a deadly weapon by a person serving a life term);
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 748, 265 S.W. 339 (1924) (burglary);
Walker v. State, 186 Md. 440, 47 A.2d 47 (1946) (attempted rape); Territory
v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718, 65 Pac. 169 (1901) (assault upon a train with
intent to commit robbery); Ellis v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 295, 19 P.2d 972(1933) (robbery with firearms); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109
S.E. 582 (1921) (attempted rape).
' Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914) (assault with intent
to commit rape).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
""Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on
moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment
-and they are forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout
our history and in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to
violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 99 (1957).
"'In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the
court followed the lingering death test and held that re-executing a man
after an electrical power failure in the first execution did not subject him
either to a lingering death or to unnecessary cruelty.
", The Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of such data in declaring
other punishments cruel and unusual. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660(1962) (punishment imposed for being a dope addict); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1957) (denationalization).
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Recent surveys conducted at home and abroad seem to reject the
contention that the death penalty is still "widely accepted"4 8 and
warrant the Supreme Court's recognition. Although many foreign
countries retain capital punishment, a very substantial number of
civilized countries have abolished it.49 Surveys of the United States
tend to question the acceptance of death as a punishment. Accord-
ing to one estimate there was a seventeen per cent decline between
1953-1960 in the number of people favoring the death penalty for
the crime of murder.8 0 More specialized interviews with prison
wardens 1 and policemen52 demonstrate divided opinions on the
efficacy of capital punishment. As already mentioned, the declining
number of executions per year compared with the increasing volume
of capital offenses53 indicates the judiciary's disfavor with the death
penalty. There is also authority that a severe penalty can come
within the eighth amendment prohibition against unnecessary cruelty
if the purposes of punishment-rehabilitation, isolation, and deter-
rence--can be achieved by a less severe punishment. 4 Undoubtedly,
"See note 45 supra.
""The death penalty is found in Australia, except in Queensland; in
Africa; and in Asia, except in Israel, Ceylon (temporary moratorium),
and the Indian provinces of Travancore and Nepal. It is in Europe and
the Americas that the cleavage of opinion is found. The countries of Eastern
Europe and the Balkans have retained it, but in Western 2urope it has been
abolished in all nations except in Spain, France, the United Kingdom and
the Irish Republic. In Latin America, it has been abolished in Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Panama, and Mexico (federal law and all but eight of the states).
In North America, Canada has retained it." SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY,
A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE 1 (1959).
coBEDAU 240.
"In one survey, 89% of the wardens interviewed did not regard capital
punishment as deterrent to murder. Thomas, Attitudes of Wardens Toward
the Death Penalty, in BEDAU 244.
", Campion, Attitudes of State Police toward the Death Penalty, in id. at
252.
" A comparison of the volume of crimes with the number of executions
for that crime in 1962 shows that there were 8,400 murders and only 41
executions; 16,310 rapes and only 4 executions; 139,600 assaults, 95,260 rob-
beries, 892,800 burglaries with only 2 executions for crimes other than
murder or rape. See BEDAU 65, Table 1; 110-11. In North Carolina there
were 5,786 convictions for burglary in Superior Court between 1960-61.
[1960-1962] N.C. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL RE'. 214-15. Yet since 1909, there
have only been 11 executions for burglary. Letter from the North Carolina
Parole Board to Floyd McKissick, February 10, 1964, on file in the North
Carolina Law Library.
" Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (concurring opinion
of Douglas); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1957) (concurring opinion
of Black and Douglas); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
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the deterrent factor is the basic purpose in retaining the death
penalty.55 Thus, if capital punishment does not in fact deter, it
could be unnecessarily cruel. Yet, the death penalty remains un-
questioned by the Supreme Court in spite of exhaustive studies by
sociologists and criminologists which led one of them to the con-
clusion: "[T]he death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence
on the extent or fluctuating rates of capital crimes. It has failed
as a deterrent."56  Comparisons made of those states that have
abolished the death penalty and those that retain it, refute the con-
tentions that homicide rates increase without the death penalty,5"
that capital punishment is necessary for the protection of the police, 3
or that' executions actually serve as a deterrent to future crimes. 9
Thus, such surveys and statistics illustrate that there is a doubt
whether capital punishment per se is acceptable or necessary in
present-day society; however, it should also be noted that these
surveys are, for the most part, directed toward the total abolition of
capital punishment, leaving the constitutionality of death as a punish-
ment for rape, burglary, and arson in even more uncertainty.
As the eighth amendment derives its meaning from the changing
standards of society, the death penalty can not be condoned under
a standard set by ancient penal theories. If capital punishment for
various, if not all crimes, is constitutional, the courts must consider
it according to contemporary society, and ratify it in view of the
standards of contemporary society. It is hoped that Justice Gold-
berg's dissent in the principal case indicates that, in future capital
cases the Supreme Court will apply the evolving standards test and
take judicial notice of those facts illustrative of a changed society.
JOSEPH DONALD WALSH, JR.
" Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Aft. 417 (1914) ; State v. Tomasi, 75
N.J.L. 739, 69 Atl. 214 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908); People ex rel. Kemmler
v. Durston, 119 N.Y. 569, 24 N.E. 6 (1890).
Sellin, Death and Imprisonment as Deterrents to Murder, in BEDAu 284.
Id. at 274.
'8 A 1950 survey of 82 cities in states abolishing capital punishment, with
a population total of 2,804,757, and 182 cities in states that have retained it
with a population total of 7,147,216, showed that the rate per 100,000 of fatal
attacks on the police was 1.2 for the abolition cities and 1.3 for the reten-
tionist cities. Sellin, Does the Death Penalty Protect the Municipal Police,
in BEDAU 291-92.
" Savitz, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in Philadalphia, in
id. at 315; Graves, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in California,
in id. at 322.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Self-Incrimination-Possibility of Subjecting
Witness to Punitive Damages
In Allred v. Graves,' the plaintiff, seeking compensatory and
punitive damages, alleged in her complaint that the nine defendants,
pursuant to a preconcerted conspiracy, came to her home where they
unlawfully and maliciously assaulted her and several members of
her family and shot into the automobiles and house of the plaintiff.
The defendants, in their answer, denied the assault on the plaintiff
or on anyone else. The plaintiff thereupon applied for an adverse
examination of the defendants,2 which the clerk ordered.8 On the
day set for the examination the defendants appeared, and through
counsel moved to dismiss the order of examination on the grounds
that the plaintiff was seeking punitive damages; that should punitive
damages be awarded by the jury, the defendants' liberty could be
affected; and that consequently the order of examination would be
the equivalent of compelling the defendants to give evidence against
themselves which would be violative of the federal and state constitu-
tion.
4
In a hearing on the motion before the Judge of the Superior
Court, the parties stipulated that all the defendants had already been
tried for all criminal charges arising out of the occurrences. The
judge held that article I, section 11 of the Constitution of North
Carolina5 applied only to criminal actions, and that the defendant
would have to answer questions at the adverse examination.' The
defendants appealed from this order.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
trial judge was correct in refusing to dismiss the order for examina-
tion ;7 however, the court held that the defendants may not be com-
pelled to answer questions at the examination the answers to which
261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E.2d 186 (1964).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.11(a) (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.11(b)
(Supp. 1963).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.11 (c) (1953).
' 261 N.C. at 33, 134 S.E2d at 188.
N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11: "In all criminal prosecutions, every person
charged with crime has the right to... not be compelled to give self-incrimi-
nating evidence."
' 261 N.C. at 33, 134 S.E.2d at 189.
7Id. at 39, 134 S.E.2d at 193: The court held that a motion to dismiss the
order of examination' entirely was not proper, but that the order should be
modified so that the defendants should not be compelled to answer specific
questions which might tend to incriminate them.
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will necessarily tend to subject them to punitive damages or body
execution.8
The result is that North Carolina no longer applies the privilege
against self-incrimination solely to criminal actions, but also applies
the privilege to civil actions in which punitive damages are sought,
an award of which might subject the defendant to body execution.
In reaching this result, the court reasoned that it is well-accepted
law that a witness should not, in any proceeding, be compelled to give
testimony that will tend to incriminate him or subject him to fines,
penalties, or forfeitures ;9 that this constitutional guaranty should be
liberally construed ;"o that punitive damages are penal in nature, and
not compensatory;" and that, therefore, the defendants should not
be required to subject themselves to a penalty through self-incrimina-
tion. 2
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Counselman v.
Hitchcock,' held that the privilege against self-incrimination was
not confined only to criminal cases against the one invoking the
privilege. The Court held that broadly construing the Constitutional
privilege, no person should be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, that an investigation before a grand jury
was a criminal proceeding, and, therefore, the witness before such
jury was entitled to invoke the privilege.'4 Further, the Court said,
in dictum: "The object was to insure that a person should not be
compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give
testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed
a crime."' 5
The next major deviation from the ancient doctrine that the
privilege pertained solely to criminal proceedings came in McCarthy
v. Arndstein.,' decided in 1924. In that case, the Supreme Court
squarely held that the privilege applied in all proceedings, both civil
and criminal.
8 id. at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192.
9 Id. at 34, 134 S.E.2d at 189.
20 Ibid.11 Id. at 36, 134 S.E.2d at 190.
22 Id. at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192.
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
142 U.S. at 562.
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
'*266 U.S. 34 (1924).
1? "The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the pro-
ceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to
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Since Counselman and Arndstein, it has been held that the privi-
lege against self-incrimination may be exercised by a witness in any
proceeding.' Thus in all kinds of examinations before a court,"0
in grand jury investigations,2" in legislative or quasi-legislative in-
vestigations,21 in administrative investigations,22 and other type pro-
ceedings, the privilege had been held applicable. The conclusion
necessarily follows that no longer is there any problem as to the
kind of proceedings or investigations in which the privilege may be
invoked.
With this conclusion in mind, let us examine the type of facts
that are protected from disclosure. Wigmore says that: "The facts
protected from disclosure are distinctly facts involving a criminal
liability or its equivalent. Hence facts involving a civil liability are
entirely without the scope of the privilege." Exactly what the
"equivalent" of criminal liability is has often eluded the courts.
Facts that might tend to subject the witness to infamy and public
disgrace are not protected by the privilege.24 In Ullmann v. United
States,25 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Federal Immunity Act of 1954 which authorized compelled testi-
mony of witnesses in cases which involved the national security and
granted immunity from prosecution, penalty, or forfeiture arising
out of the testimony they were compelled to give. In Ullmann,
the petitioner had claimed that disclosure would disable him im-
civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject
to criminal responsibility him who gives it." Id. at 40.
" See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2252 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE] ; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 433 (1957).
" E.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958) (denaturalization
proceeding in a district court) ; United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1951) (upon forfeiture of bail; examination by district of trustees of bail
fund; privilege held waived); Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 270-72(D.C. Cir. 1942) (preliminary hearing before committing magistrate);
Owen v. Fisher, 189 Misc. 69, 66 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (pretrial
examination of defendant).
2" Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).2 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) ; Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155 (1955).
22 Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (before an OPA ex-
aminer) ; Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938) (examina-
tion by immigration officers).
" 8 WIGMOa § 2254 at 331. (Emphasis added.) This section was
cited by the North Carolina court in Allred. 261 N.C. at 34, 134 S.E.2d at189.
" Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896).5 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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measurably-viz., loss of his job, expulsion from labor unions,
passport eligibility, and general public disgrace.26 However, the
majority, in rejecting these contentions, reiterated the rule enunciated
in Brown v. Walker,27 that the immunity need only protect the wit-
ness from exposure to a criminal charge; if he is sufficiently pro-
tected from criminal prosecution, he may not invoke the privilege. 8
The vigorous dissent in Ullmann agreed with the petitioner.
The dissenting justices, Douglas and Black, contended that for-
feiture of rights of citizenship should be protected to the same
degree as property rights, and that the compelled testimony in
question would undoubtedly deprive the petitioner of some of his
valuable rights of citizenship.2 9 They further concluded that "the
Fifth Amendment was designed to protect the accused -against in-
famy as well as against prosecution." 30
Allred did not involve the claim that the facts sought to be dis-
closed might subject the defendants to infamy and public disgrace.
The dissent in Ullmann, however, does serve to show a liberal de-
parture from the old rules requiring a strict interpretation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. If such a view were to prevail,
it would not require that the facts tend to subject the witness, to a
criminal liability, but only that such facts would deprive the witness
of his various rights of citizenship.
As previously stated, the privilege against self-incrimination is
ordinarily available only where a possible criminal prosecution may
result from the testimony.3 1 But the concept of "criminal prosecu-
tion" has been extended to include penalties and forfeitures which
are of a penal nature, and most jurisdictions have enacted this ex-
tension of the privilege as a statutory or constitutional provision.3 2
"' Id. at 430.27161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896).
21 350 U.S. at 430-31.
20 350 U.S. at 442-43.
" 350 U.S. at 450. Wigmore suggests that the dissenters in both Ullmann
and Brown overlooked the fact that historically there is a difference in the
privilege against disclosing facts involving infamy and the privilege against
self-incrimination. 8 WIGMORE § 2254. See Smith v. United States, 337
U.S. 137 (1949) (pointing out the distinction). Although the privilege
against disclosing infamous facts has largely dissipated, several states have
preserved it by statute; see, e.g., ALASKA ComP. LAws ANN. § 58-6-12
(1948); CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 2065 (1955) ; GA. CoDE § 38-1205 (1935);
S.C. CODE § 9-214 (1962). See also McCoRMicx, EvIDENcE § 128 (1954).
"' See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956); McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).2 See 8 WIGMORB §§ 2256-57.
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The words "penalty" and "forfeiture" have frequently been used
indiscriminately by the courts; for this reason, a shorthand definition
of each might be kept in mind during the remainder of this note.
A forfeiture may be said to be a loss resulting from the breach of a
stipulation imposed by the parties,"' while a penalty, on the other
hand, flows from the breach of a duty imposed by law.84
The North Carolina court, in Allred, considered the possibility
of having to pay punitive damages a penalty, and thereby extended
the privilege against self-incrimination to the defendants.8 5 The
court said: "When the penalty lies in the payment of money, the
Courts are in conflict."" At this point, the court quoted a footnote
from Wigmore37 which does in fact show that there has been a
conflict where a statute prescribes a fixed sum or a multiple of actual
loss for some act of the defendant. There has been no case, and
surely no "conflict," holding or rejecting the contention that a
possibility of punitive damages warrants the extension of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to the witness. In fact, the text to
which the above-mentioned footnote applies expressly says that if
the "penalty" is by way of punitive damages, it is still a civil liability
and in no way a criminal penalty.3"
The United States Supreme Court has extended the concept of
"criminal prosecution" to include penalties and forfeitures only
twice: in both cases the penalty or forfeiture was applied directly
as a punishment for a crime, viz., the forfeiture of imported goods
for failure to pay the applicable tariff, 9 and a civil penalty imposed
for the illegal importation of aliens.4 ° In both these cases, the
nature rather than the form of the action was controlling. The
penalty or forfeiture applied in each case was essentially punishment
for the violation of the applicable law.41
" See Chauncey v. Tahourden, 2 Atk. 392, 26 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ch. 1742).
' See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892).
11 261 N.C. at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192.
Id. at 36, 134 S.E.2d at 190.
8 WIGMORE § 2257 at 337 n.3.
38 "When the penalty lies in the payment of money, it seems clear that a
mere unregulated increase of compensation under the name of exemplary
damages is still a civil liability in essence, and therefore the same consequence
ought to follow when by statute a fixed sum, or multiple based on actual loss,
is prescribed." 8 WIGMORE § 2257 at 337. The cases cited by Wigmore as
authority for this statement show merely a conflict as far as the type of
statutes mentioned, and do not even mention exemplary damages.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
"Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). "If an indictment had
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In all the cases that have followed the line of reasoning laid
down in the two above-mentioned cases, therefore, the nature of the
proceeding-that is, criminal-is the controlling factor, not the
form. For example, in early actions for treble damages under the
Emergency Price Control Act it was held that the privilege applied
for the reason that the statutory damages were not merely remedial,
but penal.42 Later opinions of the circuit courts would impliedly
overrule the earlier decisions of several district courts on this point,
holding the privilege inapplicable.43
Following the same reasoning, the privilege has been allowed in
courts of chancery under bills of discovery and under statutory
interrogatories to a party." Wilson v. Union Tool Co. 5 was an
been presented against the claimants, upon conviction the forfeiture of the
goods could have been included in the judgment. If the government prose-
cutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil information against
the claimants-that is, civil in form--can he by this device take from the
proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their immunities
as citizens, and extort from them a production of their private papers, or,
as an alternative, a confession of guilt? This cannot be. The information,
though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal
one.... As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the
commission of offences against the law, are of a quasi-criminal nature, we
think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for... that
portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. at 634.
(Emphasis added.)
"2 Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1945). See also
City of Philadelphia v. Cline, 158 Pa. Super. 179, 44 A.2d 610 (1945) (action
under municipal ordinance to recover penalties for failure to file tax returns;
privilege applies); Boyle v. Smithman, 146 Pa. 255, 23 AtI. 397 (1892)
(action to recover penalties for not posting a statement of business done,
under a statute declaring that the defendant "shall forfeit and pay" $1000 for
each act; privilege applies). The Trowbridge case was also decided on
another ground. The defendant had not yet been tried for the criminal
aspect of his act. Therefore, he could not be required to give evidence that
could be later used against him. 60 F. Supp. at 50. This was the entire
basis of the decision in Porter v. Heend, 6 F.R.D. 588 (N.D. Il. 1947). The
court in Porter said in a suit for treble damages under the Emergency Price
Control Act that it need not even consider whether the damages were
remedial or penal, because the defendant would not be required to answer
anygay.
"Crary v. Porter, 157 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1946). "In addition, mere
increased or multiple damages, whether they be for exemplary or other
public-interest purposes, whose allowance is dependent upon the recovery of
actual damages, have never been regarded as constituting a criminal penalty."
Id. at 414. See also Kessler v. Fleming, 163 F.2d 464. (9th Cir. 1947)
(action under Emergency Price Control Act for treble damages; might be
considered a "penalty," but it is only remedial and not a substitute for
criminal prosecution); Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946).
"Speidel Co. v. N. Barstow Co., 232 Fed. 617 (D.R.I. 1916).
"'275 Fed. 624 (S.D. Cal. 1921).
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action brought for treble damages for patent infringement; in deny-
ing discovery, a California district court followed the rule of equity
which denies discovery if the answer solicited would tend to subject
the party to a penalty, forfeiture or criminal process.4" However,
the same court, two years later in Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Owen,47 completely reversed itself, though not expressly overruling
Union Tool. Perkins held that the statute allowing treble damages
.was remedial; that the action was to redress a private aggrievance;
that the defendant would not, by any disclosure, make himself liable
to prosecution for any public offense. Therefore, no constitutional
right would be invaded by compelling him to answer the interroga-
tories.4" Another court in the same circuit was again faced with
the question in Schlage Lock Co. v. Pratt-Ryner Co.4 It acknowl-
edged the inconsistency of the two previous cases, Union Tool and
Perkins, and adopted the rule of the latter.
Another line of cases cited as authority for the Allred decision
would not seem to be applicable at all.80  In all four of these cases,
a Mississippi immunity statute was held to protect the defendants
from any prosecution, penalties, or forfeitures arising out of the
illegal sale of liquor. It is submitted that the Mississippi court was
not concerned with whether or not the penalties came within the
concept of "criminal prosecution" for the reason that it found that
the clear import of the immunity statute was to protect the witnesses
from any penalty arising from the facts testified to, be it penal or
remedial.5 1
Where the punishment imposed is not penal, but remedial, there
was no holding prior to Ullmann by the Supreme Court as to whether
the privilege was applicable. The Court had considered the concept
of "remedial forfeiture" only once, in United States v. Hess,52 and
then in terms of double jeopardy, not of self-incrimination. In
that case, the recovery, for the violation of a public housing act
after the imposition of criminal sanctions, of double damages plus
"Id. at 629-30.
293 Fed. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1923).
48 293 Fed. at 761.
" 46 F.2d 703 (N.D. Cal. 1931).
Bailey v. Muse, 227 Miss. 51, 85 So. 2d 918 (1956) ; Zambroni v. State,
217 Miss. 418, 64 So. 2d 335 (1953); Serio v. Gully, 189 Miss. 558, 198 So.
307 (1940); Malouf v. Gully, 187 Miss. 331, 192 So. 2 (1939).
"Bailey v. Muse, 227 Miss. 51, 56-57, 85 So. 2d 918, 922-23 (1956),
brings this point out very clearly.52317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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a penalty was held not to violate the constitutional guaranty against
double jeopardy. The Court ruled that the double damages and the
penalty were imposed merely to compensate the government for the
damage done by the violations of the act, i.e., the penalties were
remedial, not penal.
From the above discussion, it may be seen that the only cases
which hold the privilege against self-incrimination applicable where
the witness may be subject to "penalties" by way of payment of
money are those in which the courts feel that the "penalty" is not
remedial, but criminally penal; ones where the damages sought are
imposed as a criminal penalty or substitute therefore, and not where
they are intended to compensate private aggrievances. Admittedly,
punitive damages are "penal," as the court in Allred stresses ;" also
it is true that the defendants might become subject to body execution
upon failure to pay the judgment for such damages. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the damages are not penal within the concept
of "criminal prosecution," even though the defendants, in further-
ance of their civil liability, might be jailed by means of body execu-
tion, and that the court erred by overlooking the distinction between
merely "penal" damages which are in essence merely a further civil
liability, and "penal" damages which come within the concept of
"criminal prosecution," to which the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion extends only.
ARCH K. SciiocHr IV
Constitutional Law-Was it Intended That the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Supreme Court in 1833 established the principle that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.1 Following the Civil War
the fourteenth amendment, with its "privileges or immunities" and
"due process" clauses, cast doubt on this principle and raised the
possibility of applying the Bill of Rights to the states by incor-
porating them into the amendment.'
53 261 N.C. at 35, 134 S.E.2d at 190.
'Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Court early held in the Slaughter House Cases' that the
"privileges or immunities" clause prevented the states from abridging
those privileges or immunities that a person holds due to his United
States citizenship, but not those privileges or immunities he might
hold due to state citizenship. Thus, the decision in effect nullified the
importance of this clause for purposes of incorporation.4
The "due process" clause, however, has not been construed so
strictly. Instead, it has been utilized many times, particularly
recently, to make certain parts of the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states.5 The majority position of the Court has achieved this result
by a selective process of incorporating into the fourteenth amend-
ment only those parts of the Bill of Rights the violation of which
would also violate "those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."0
Under this process, the Court has clearly incorporated freedom of
religion,7 of speech,8 of press,9 and of assembly;"" protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures;" requirements of just com-
pensation for property; assistance of counsel;1 protection from
cruel and unusual punishments ;14 and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 14a
A minority position, led by Justice Black, contends that any act
in violation of the Bill of Rights also violates the fourteenth
amendment.:5 Justice Black bases this conclusion on his belief that
the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended that the Bill of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
883 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
'CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 187 (10th
ed. 1948).5 E.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
'it. re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890). This basic idea was earlier
stated in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.(18 How.) 272, 277 (1856).
'Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).9 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
10 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"~aMalloy v. Hogan, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4507 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
"
5 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
Dissenting with Justice Black were justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge.
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Rights be applicable to the states."8 Legal scholars differ on this
question of intent.'7  The purposes of this note are, first, to study
the events pertinent to the passage of the amendment in order to
determine the intent behind its passage, and, second, to discuss the
influence which this intent should have on present Supreme Court
decisions.
When the new Congress convened after the Civil War, the Con-
stitution had been construed so as to give little protection against
state action.'8 Barron v. Baltimore9 had limited the effect of the
Bill of Rights to the federal government, and the Dred Scott2"
decision had eliminated any possibility of the "privileges and im-
munities" clause of article IV, section 2 being used to protect the
Negro. Since these decisions gave the Negro little protection against
the "Black Codes"'" passed by many southern states, the new Con-
"* Justice Black states: "My study of the historical events that culminated
in the Fourteenth Amendment... persuades me that one of the chief objects
that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a
whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states." Id. at 71.
'" Favoring the intent-to-incorporate theory are: FLACK, THE ADOPTION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) [hereinafter cited as FLAcK];
GUTHRIE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1898). Opposing this theory are: Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. Rv. 5
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Fairman]; Graham, Our "Declaratory" Four-
teenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. Rxv. 3 (1954).
Many writers contend that the fourteenth amendment was intended to
greatly expand the federal power, but they make no mention of a specific
intent to incorporate the Bill of Rights. COLwLNS, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE STATES (1912); CORWiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (10th ed. 1948); 2 WA.RE, THE SUPREmE COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1926); Royal, The Fourteenth Amendment:
The Slaughter House Cases, 4 So. L. Rlv. 558 (1879).
8 Prior to the Civil War three decisions had severly limited federal
control over state action. First, in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546
(No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), Justice Washington adopted a limited
construction of the original "privileges and immunities" clause in article IV,
section 2, so that each state was required to give only the fundamental
rights to citizens of other states. Next, in 1833, the Court in the landmark
case of Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), held that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Finally, in Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the Court again limited the scope of the
"privileges and immunities" clause of article IV, section 2, so that what
coverage remained after Corfield did not apply to protect the Negro.
" Supra, note 18.
:0 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
21 For a general comparison of these laws see Message of the President
of the United States to the House of Representatives, Freedmen, H.R. Doc.
No. 118, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
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gress immediately sought to pass remedial legislation.22
The Civil Rights Act of 186623 was the first product. Although
it finally passed the Act over President Johnson's veto,24 Congress
itself was uncertain of its constitutional power to pass such a
measure.25 Thus, in order to assure constitutionality, the 39th
Congress began work on a constitutional amendment.20  The job of
drafting what was to become the fourteenth amendment was given
to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. The first proposal from
the Committee was drafted by Representative Bingham ;27 and, like
the Civil Rights Act, the apparent purpose was to protect the Negro
from discrimination by the southern states.28 Up to this time there
had been no proposals, bills or discussion which could possibly be
construed as an attempt or desire to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states via the new amendment. Before this first draft was perma-
nently pigeonholed, however, it gave rise to some ambiguous dis-
cussion.
On February 26, 1866, Representative Bingham, in an opening
speech to the House, outlined his conception of the problem :29 al-
though every word of the proposed amendment was already in the
Constitution, Congress had heretofore lacked the power of enforce-
ment.30 He further declared that if Congress had previously had
this power and had been able to exercise it, there would have been.
" HICKS & MOWRY, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 339
(2d ed. 1956).
23 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). This bill provided that persons born in the
United States under United States jurisdiction were citizens of the United
States, and without regard to color, were entitled in every state and territory
to the same right to contract, sue, give evidence, and take, hold and convey
property, and to the equal benefit of all laws for security of person and
property, as was enjoyed by white citizens.
In his opening speech to the Senate, Senator Trumbull clearly expressed
that the purpose of the Act was to prevent discrimination in civil rights on
account of race and to give all persons equal protection of the laws. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1865-1866).
2
,Id. at 1809.
"Id. at 1151.
2" Id. at 2459.
27 Id. at 806.
" This proposal provided: "The Congress shall have power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and to
all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty,
and property." Ibid.
"Id. at 1033.
"Id. at 1034. The proposed amendment was nothing more than a reitera-
tion of article IV, section 2, and the fifth amendment. See note 28 supra.
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no rebellion. ' Bingham then concluded that the purpose of the new
amendment was to give Congress power to enforce "this immortal
bill of rights" upon the states. 2 Use of this phrase has given rise
to conflicting interpretations as to what was intended by "bill of
rights.13
3
After Bingham's opening speech to the House, there were no
more references to the "bill of rights" until his closing speech, where
he stated that the purpose of the proposed amendment was to arm
Congress with the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states.3 '4 He then stated:
Gentlemen, admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights,
that the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the
several States, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law....85
Shortly after Representative Bingham's closing speech, con-
sideration of this draft was permanently pigeonholed. 6  How-
ever, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction immediately framed.
a new draft which was to become, after the Senate's definition of
CoNG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1034.
In part, Bingham's words were: "And, sir, it is equally clear by every
construction of the Constitution, ... that these great provisions of the
Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested
for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States."
Ibid.
" Fairman contends that "this immortal bill of rights" is to Bingham a
"fine literary phrase not referring precisely to the first eight amendments."
He argues that Bingham was referring to "the privileges or immunities"
of article IV, section 2, and to the right of life, liberty, and property of the
fifth amendment. He reasons further that if Bingham had intended to
include the first eight amendments, this would have been inconsistent with
his statement that had Congress had and exercised this power there would
have been no rebellion, for enforcement of the first amendment would not
have prevented secession. Fairman 44. On the other hand, Flack interprets
Bingham's language more literally, contending that "it meant nothing less
than the conferring upon Congress the power to enforce, in every State of the
Union, the Bill of Rights, as found in the first eight Amendments." FLAcK
57.
,CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1088.
"Id. at 1089. Fairman again believes that Bingham did not mean "the
first eight amendments" when he used the phrase "bill of rights," contending
that, in this statement, Bingham made it clear from the context that he was
referring to the fundamental freedoms of the "due process" and "privileges
or immunities" clause. Fairman 34. Flack does not analyze the speech
in detail but simply says that Bingham stated that the purpose of the amend-
ment was to give Congress power to enforce the Bill of Rights. FLAcK 59.
" CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1095.
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a citizen was added,"7 the final version of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Thaddeus Stevens introduced this new draft into the House
on May 8, 1866,38 stating that he felt the purpose of the amend-
ment was to give Congress power to correct the unjust legislation
of the states.3 9 He further expressed his belief that equal pro-
tection, designed to cure the evil of discrimination, was the domi-
nant purpose of section 1.40 Stevens reasoned that while the Civil
Rights Bill secured the same protection, an amendment would
prevent repeal of the protection by a simple majority of Congress.4"
During the last day of the House debate, Represerntative
Bingham added his reasons for giving Congress power to enforce
the Constitution against the states,42 stating: "Contrary to the ex-
press letter of your Constitution, cruel and unusual punishments
have been inflicted under state laws within the Union upon your
citizens.... ,
After passage of the amendment in the House,44 Senator
Howard introduced the proposal into the Senate.45  His introductory
speech furnishes the strongest evidence that Congress intended to
incorporate the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. In
defining the privileges and immunities to be covered by the amend-
ment, Senator Howard quoted from Corfield v. Coryell," which had
defined them as being those privileges and immunities which are in
their nature fundamental. 7 In furtherance of this definition, he
stated: "To these privileges and immunities.., should be added the
37 Id. at 2897.18 Id. at 2459.
39 Ibid.40 Ibid.
" Ibid. Fairman utilizes Representative Stevens' speech to substantiate
the position that no incorporation was intended, noting that over and over
in the discussion, the correlation between section 1 and the Civil Rights Act is
mentioned, and that since no one intended for the Civil Rights Act to in-
corporate the Bill of Rights, no one intended that the amendment do so.
Fairman 44.
"'Id. at 2542.
"'Ibid. Flack relies on Bingham's reference to "cruel and unusual
punishments" as further evidence that the Bill of Rights was intended to be
incorporated. FLAcK 79-80. Fairman answers this by contending that
Bingham was only arguing in favor of a selective incorporation process by
means of the "due process" clause. Fairman 53.
" CONG. GLoBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 2545. This was done only after
three days debate, the vote being 128 for and 37 against. Ibid.
,Id. at 2765.
"6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
17 Id. at 551-52.
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personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution .. ,,4s Senator Howard then proceeded
to read each of the first eight amendments,4 9 stating that there was
no power in the Constitution for Congress to enforce them, and that
the purpose of the proposed amendment was to give Congress such
power.5"
After passage by the Senate,51 the amendment was submitted to
the states on June 16, 1866,52 and was adopted two years later.53
There was practically no discussion in the state legislatures of the
conflict that the first eight amendments might have with their present
state laws.54 To this there was one notable exception. In. the Massa-
chusetts House the proposed amendment received an unfavorable
report from its Committee on Federal Relations.5 5 The Committee
considered section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to be surplusage,
stating that it did not see where this section differed from article IV,
CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 2765.
"Ibid.
Id. at 2766. Flack points out that Howard's interpretation of the
amendment was not questioned by anyone, and that since no member of the
Committee gave a different interpretation or questioned his statement, his
interpretation must be accepted as that of the Committee. FLACK 87. The
opposing view agrees that what is said by a member for a reporting com-
mittee is ordinarily entitled to very special consideration, "but others may,
without challenging those views, have supported the measure for quite
inconsistent reasons." Fairman 66. It should also be noted in this context
that the minority opposed the amendment for the very reasons that Howard
gave in support of it. FL-ACK 87.
Fairman points out the repetition in incorporating the "due process" clause
of the fifth amendment and also restating it in the fourteenth. Fairman 58.
It would appear that this contention is somewhat irrelevant. It is true that
Congress would be repeating itself by including two "due process" clauses,
but this does not explain away Howard's belief that the fourteenth amend-
ment included the Bill of Rights.
" CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 3042. This was done on June 8,
1866, the vote being 33 for, 11 against, with 5 absent. Ibid.
:2 FLACK 140.
,' FLACK 191 n.117.
' Fairman 82. Professor Fairman points to several of the state laws
which would conflict with the fourteenth amendment as evidence that the
states did not intend to incorporate. He notes further that several states
(Connecticut, Kansas, and Michigan) did not require that a person charged
with "a capital or otherwise infamous crime" be indicted by a grand jury
as is required by the fifth amendment. Yet, says Fairman, there was no
suggestion by their legislatures that their state law conflicted with the fifth
amendment.
Fairman also noted that New Hampshire's Constitution made provision
for the support and maintenance of Protestant ministers, yet no question of
the first amendment's provision for freedom of religion was discussed by
the legislature.
" H.R. Doc. No. 149, 1, 25 (Mass. 1867).
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section 2, and amendments I, II, V, and VIII." During the period
in which the question of ratification was before the state legislatures,
there were no statements in the newspapers as to whether the first
eight amendments were to be applicable to the states.57
Less than a year after the states had adopted the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court in Twitchell v. Pennsylvania"' re-
fused to consider whether the fifth and sixth amendments applied to
the states. Citing Barron, Chief Justice Case spoke for an unanimous
court in refusing to take jurisdiction by writ of error, stating that ap-
plication of the fifth and sixth amendments to the states was "no
longer a subject of discussion. ' 59
Two years later, in 1871, the question arose in the House as to
whether the "privileges or immunities" clause of the fourteenth
amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights. 0 During
this debate Representative Bingham read each of the first eight
amendments and stated that the "privileges or immunities" clause
"
0Ibid. Professor Flack states that this Committee report is valuable
because it shows that the legislature, in adopting the report, "accepted the
statements made in it that the first section was but a reiteration of the
guarantees enumerated in the Amendments." FLACK 188.
Professor Fairman points out that the Committee was completely wrong
in believing that the Bill of Rights applied to the states, citing Barron.
Fairman 120. This explanation appears irrelevant for there is no significance
in the fact that the Committee was unaware of this decision. What is im-
portant is that the Committee thought that the fourteenth amendment included
some of the Bill of Rights.
"' FLACK 153. Flack states that, "it may be inferred that this was recog-
nized to be the logical result by those who thought that the freedom of speech
and of the press as well as due process of law, including jury trial, were
secured by it." Id. at 153-54.
Professor Fairman points out that it may be equally inferred that these
persons suggested a "selective" incorporation of certain freedoms expressed
in the Bill of Rights. Fairman 81.
5874 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869). The petitioner had been sentenced to
death for murder. In seeking a writ of error it was contended that he had
not been indicted by a grand jury, which was in violation of the fifth
amendment, and that he had not been informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation, which was in violation of the sixth amendment. The four-
teenth amendment now guarantees the protection of the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 32 U.S.L. WEEK
4507 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
5974 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 325. This case is cited as showing that the
fourteenth amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights.
Fairman 132. Part of what was "no longer a subject of discussion" in
Twitchell is now. See Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 58.
"0 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 111-18 (1871). The fact that this
question was debated within five years after passage is an indication of the
conflicting intentions within Congress.
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made them an express prohibition upon every state.6' It would seem
that this speech by Bingham is conclusive evidence that he intended
the Bill of Rights to be incorporated.
2
Reviewing the Congressional debate, the state legislative dis-
cussion, and the general public response, it can be seen that the
evidence in favor of the intent-to-incorporate theory consists of
Representative Bingham's speeches in the House, Senator Howard's
introductory speech in the Senate, and the Committee Report in the
Massachusetts legislature. On the other hand, the evidence opposed
to the intent-to-incorporate theory consists of the total lack of
newspaper discussion about incorporation, the lack of discussion in
the state legislatures (except Massachusetts), and of the Supreme
Court decision in Twitchell. Note that the evidence in favor of the
intent to incorporate theory is found entirely within the congressional
debates, while the evidence opposed is found entirely outside of the
debates. Thus, the conclusion follows that Congress intended in-
corporation, while the states and the general public did not.63 How-
ever, the above conclusion raises the additional problem: how could
the states blindly ratify an amendment not knowing its actual intent?
The post-Civil War atmosphere, which is difficult for us to compre-
hend today, supplies the answer. It would appear that the framers
desired a strong amendment limiting states' rights and including
the Bill of Rights."- Yet they saw that sufficient support in Con-
gress did not necessarily mean sufficient support by the states. 5
61 After reading the Bill of Rights, one by one, Bingham said, "These
eight articles... never were a limitation upon the power of the State, until
made so by the Fourteenth Amendment. The words of that Amendment
'no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States' are an express prohibition upon
every State." Id. at 115.
" Thus, Professor Fairman's contention that Bingham was using the
term "bill of rights" as a fine literary phrase becomes more difficult to accept.
See note 33 supra.
' 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 53941
(1926); Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 869, 904 (1948); Note, Purpose and
Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 So. CAL. L. REv. 47, 53 (1947);
Note, The Fourteenth Amendment Challenged, 36 GEo. L.J. 398, 410 (1948).
o" COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 10 (1912);
FLACK 94; GUTHRIE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 60-61 (1898); The Fourteenth Amendment Chal-
lenged, supra note 63, at 405; Note, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 IowA L. REv. 666, 667 (1948).
as COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 10; The Fourteenth Amendment
Challenged, supra note 63, at 405; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 64, at 667.
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Therefore, the framers resorted to broad language that was accepted
by the House after only three days of discussion and by the Senate
after five days of discussion and that was ratified during the post-
Civil War hate-the-South-and-help-the-Negro period. 6 In addition,
the attention of the general population and their representatives was
focused on punishing the South and finding some way to protect
the newly freed Negro from the "Black Codes." 7 This explains
why most of the discussion in Congress centered around the effects
the new amendment would have on the Negro. Congress and the
states no doubt thought that passing the amendment would give
Congress power to carry out a program of reconstruction and that
use of this power would focus naturally against the southern states0"
Moreover, ratification was achieved by requiring the southern states
to ratify before being re-admitted to the Union."
The conflicting intentions of Congress and of the states raise
the constructional problem of whose intent will be given the greater
weight.7" In Maxwell v. Dow71 the Supreme Court stated that in
the case of an ambiguous constitutional amendment the Court
should not only evaluate Congress's intention but should also look
to the ratifying states' intentions. In the case of an ambiguous
amendment it would appear that since an amendment has no effect
until ratified by the states, it should be given no broader construction
than the states intended. 2 Thus, it follows that the fourteenth
amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights.
But, assuming that the intent-to-incorporate theory might be cor-
rect, an additional problem needs clarifying: which particular clause
incorporates the Bill of Rights? Either the "privileges or immuni-
" COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 10-12; 2 WAxmmN, op. cit. supra
note 63, at 539-40; The Fourteenth Amendment Challenged, supra note 63,
at 405; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 64,
at 667.
"' COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 9; 2 WAamN, op. cit. supra note 63,
at 540; Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7
MicH. L. REv. 643, 645 (1908).
" COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 10; FLACK 94.
" COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 142; The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 64, at 667.
"
0 This problem assumes that "intent" should be considered in interpreting
a law. See tenBroek, Use by The United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic
Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CAL. L. Rnv. 437 (1938), for reasons
for rejecting the "intent" theory.
' 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
" tenBroek, supra note 70, at 453; IV Worthington, Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison 211 (1884).
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ties" clause or the "due process" clause may be relied upon to sup-
port the incorporation theory.73 Three reasons favor incorporation
through the "privileges or immunities" clause.
First, all the evidence (the speeches of Bingham and Howard
and the Massachusetts Committee Report) in support of the in-
corporation theory pointed toward incorporation through the "privi-
leges or immunities" clause, not the "due process" clause. Both
Howard in his Senate address' and the Massachusetts Committee
Report75 stated that the privileges or immunities were those ex-
pressed in the first eight amendments. Also, Bingham said in his
explanation to the House in 1871 that he intended the "privileges
or immunities" clause to include the first eight amendments. 16  No
such statements were made about the "due process" clause.
Second, the "due process" clause of the fifth amendment had been
recently (1856) and clearly defined in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co.17 There the Supreme Court held that
an act was not due process if it violated "those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England . ,, "74 This decision supports the natural law construc-
tion of the majority of the Court but not the full incorporation theory
advocated by Black.
Third, the natural reading of the "privileges or immunities"
clause in conjunction with the "citizenship" clause supports the in-
corporation theory.79 Thus, incorporation must take place, if at all,
through the "privileges or immunities" clause.s0
Even if the intent-to-incorporate theory is correct, it does not
" Justice Black does not take a position on the question. See note 17
supra.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1865-1866).
' H. R. Doc. No. 149, 1, 25 (Mass. 1867).
° CONG. GLOBE, supra note 60, at 115.759 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
°Id. at 277.
"'Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 76 (1947), agrees
with this natural reading and favorably quotes Professor Royal who stated
in The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, 4 So. L. REv.
558 (1870), "Ninety-nine out of every one hundred educated men, upon
reading this section over, would at first say that it forbade a State to make
or enforce a law which abridged any privilege or immunity whatever of one
who was a citizen of the United States." Id. at 563.
.. GUTHRIE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 60-61 (1898); Purpose and Scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 63, at 57; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 64, at 668.
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necessarily follow that the Supreme Court should today incorporate
the Bill of Rights. Rather, stare decisis and the social pressures to
incorporate should be considered.
The social pressures to incorporate have been held to a minimum
by the "due process" clause. In order to insure justice, the Supreme
Court has not needed to incorporate the Bill of Rights in its en-
tirety.81 Instead, the Court, relying on the due process clause,
need only find that the state action violates "those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions." 2
This selective process has the advantage of not requiring that
all of the first eight amendments be applied against the states.83
Some of the amendments are no longer as necessary as they once
were. For example, the second amendment guaranteeing the right
to bear arms is not as important today as it once was. Also, the
seventh amendment's twenty dollar maximum limit on certain trials
without a jury is outdated due to inflation.
Thus, even if it be assumed that the fourteenth amendment was
intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights, respect for stare decisis,
plus lack of pressure to overrule past decisions are sufficient reasons
to reject Justice Black's incorporation theory8 4
FRANx H. WALKER, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Abstention-Right to Return to Federal Courts
The "abstention doctrine" is the name given to the principles
applied by the federal courts when they refuse to decide a case over
which they properly have jurisdiction,1 and leave the plaintiff with
the necessity of presenting part,' or all,3 of the questions in the
"' Green, supra note 63, at 906; Comment, The Adamson Case: A Study
in Constitutional Technique, 58 YALE L.J. 268, 287 (1949); The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 64, at 675.
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
s" Green, supra note 89, at 906.
"' Purpose and Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 89, at
47; A Study in Constitutiotul Technique, supra note 106, at 268; The Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 90.
' Abstention is a decision on the merits, one which comes after the
question of jurisdiction. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,
370 U.S. 713 (1963) (per curiam) (implicit), 42 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1963).
'E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).3 E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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case to a state tribunal in order to get an adjudication of his rights.4
The power to decline to exercise jurisdiction was originally found
in the discretion of the chancellor sitting in equity,5 but recently
there have been indications that general policy considerations of
comity will allow abstention in suits at law, at least where a vital
interest of a state is involved.6 Although the doctrine is applied in
many situations, 7 the cases fall into two categories for the purposes
of this note: (1) those in which the federal action is merely stayed
until the state courts have had an opportunity to state authoritatively
what the state law is,' and (2) those in which the federal action is
dismissed,9 thus ending such a case's contact with the federal courts
until it comes to the Supreme Court from the state courts by appeal
or certiorari. In order to understand why a case is disposed of in
one or the other of these ways, it is first necessary to understand the
considerations that impel abstention in each class of cases.
'Up-to-date general discussions of the abstention doctrine are found in:
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Note,
59 COLUm. L. REv. 749 (1959); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).
' Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
'Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28
(1959) (eminent domain proceeding removed to federal court on basis of
diversity). Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (inter-
sovereign certification).
" "[I]t is more precise to refer to 'abstention doctrines' since there are
at least four distinguishable lines of cases, involving different factual situa-
tions, involving different procedural consequences, different support in the
decisions of the Supreme Court, and different arguments for and against
their validity." WRIGHT 169. Two of Professor Wright's "four dis-
tinguishable lines of cases" are not directly taken up here as they are only
collateral to the purposes of this note. One of these involves abstention
solely in order to "leave to the states ihe resolution of unsettled questions of
state law." Id. at 175. It had generally been thought that unsettled state law
alone was not sufficient reason for a federal court to abstain. Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, following what it thought to be the general trend Qf the cases,
recently held that it was proper for a federal court to abstain in private
diversity cases solely because the state law was unsettled and difficult to
ascertain. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 18, 1964) (No. 958).
The denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, with only Justice Douglas
dissenting, leaves the state of the law in this area in confusion.
The other "distinguishable line of cases" involves abstention in order
"to ease the congestion of the federal court docket." VRIG3T 176-77.
Cases supporting abstention for this purpose are: P. Beiersdorf & Co. v.
McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301(2d Cir. 1949). Contra, Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 835
(9th Cir. 1963).
8 See the cases cited in note 2 supra.
o See the cases cited in note 3 supra.
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Lurking behind all abstention cases are considerations of comity
between dual sovereigns, and a desire to avoid an unnecessary dis-
ruption by federal courts of state policies as expressed in state
statutes, case law, and administrative action.10 In the abstention
cases in which an order of dismissal is appropriate, these are the
primary considerations. Here, the federal courts completely defer
to the state tribunal because it is felt that "a state tribunal is a more
appropriate one for resolving the [whole] controversy."'" The
state tribunal is usually declared to be more appropriate "in order
to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its
own affairs."' 2  Thus, a federal court will not usually entertain
either a suit challenging state administrative action under a com-
plicated regulatory scheme,' 3 a suit for a declaratory judgment
against a state tax,"4 a suit to enjoin a state criminal prosecution, 5
or a suit to enjoin the use of illegally obtained evidence in a state
court.16 The plaintiff's federal constitutional claims can be pro-
tected through the appeal and certiorari procedures.'1
A different consideration is most often foremost in the thinking
of the courts when it is decided to stay the federal action rather than
dismiss. Here, the abstaining federal court is usually seeking to
avoid an unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional ques-
"The doctrine has been described as an extention by the courts of the
same policies embodied in the federal statutes providing for three-judge
district courts in suits seeking injunctions against state statutes and for-
bidding injunctions against certain types of state action. Wright, The
Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815, 815-16 (1959);
Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 749-50 (1959). This conclusion finds support
in Justice Frankfurter's comment in the "original" abstention case that "this
use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the
harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need
of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers." Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
"England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
423 (1964) (concurring opinion).
SWRIGHT 172.
"3Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951)(suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute which forbade discontinu-
ance of train service without permission of the commission); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (suit to enjoin the execution of a proration
order given by a state commission in charge of oil).
1, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
E.g., Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Beal v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
"Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S.
458 (1961); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
•Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 US. 157, 163 (1943); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
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tions in a suit attacking state action.'8 It is a maxim of federal prac-
tice to avoid decisions on constitutional issues if the case can be
disposed of on other grounds. 9 In a situation where the state law
is uncertain and federal constitutional claims could be mooted, or
changed in nature," by construction of the state law, the reasoning
of the federal courts is simply this: Any determination by a federal
court as to the meaning of a state statute would only be tentative
since the state courts have the final word as to the meaning of
state law; therefore, the state court should be given an opportunity
to have the final word on it before a federal court measures it against
the strictures of the constitution.21 Abstention in this situation,
called Pullrnan-type abstention,22 involves no fundamental decision
that the state tribunal is a "more appropriate" one for the suit. This
is shown by the fact that abstention is improper when the state law
involved is settled,23 or clearly unconstitutional under any possible
construction of it.' Thus, the decision to abstain in this situation
is not to be made automatically merely because state law is involved2 5
but rather is to be made after considering these questions and also
weighing any possible factors that call for an immediate decision as
opposed to the delay engendered by abstention.2' As the Supreme
18 E.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134
(1962); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the
process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on
questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable."
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). Cf.
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).20 AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 596-98 (1946).
21Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941). The
federal courts have jurisdiction to decide ancilliary questions of state law in
federal question litigation. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175
(1909). This type of abstention, then, is a decision not to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the ancilliary questions. WRIGHT 170.
22 So called from the name of the first case in which this technique was
employed, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22 City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958);
Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
2 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (statute requiring
segregation).
25 It is error to automatically abstain. NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471
(1959) (per curiam).
2" Ordinarily, the fact that the delay caused by abstention will injure the
plaintiff's interests has not been considered by the courts in determining
whether or not they will abstain. However, there are recent indications that
such will no longer be the case, at least in civil rights litigation. In Griffin v.
County School Bd., 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4413 (U.S. May 25, 1964), the
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Court has said, "this principle does not.., involve the abdication of
federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise ....
Therefore, a stay of the federal action is all that is required in order
to carry out the purposes of this Pullman-type abstention, and it is
error to dismiss such a case." The plaintiff is entitled to an ad-
judication of his constitutional objections in the federal court once
the state court has settled, or had an opportunity to settle,20 the
state law in question.
Under Pullman-type abstention as originally contemplated, it
would seem that the plaintiff who has been sent back to the state
Virginia school-closing case, the Supreme Court reversed a circuit court
decision to abstain and proceeded to the merits of the case. The Court noted
that the issues had been passed upon by the state courts, but added: "[Q]uite
independently of this, we hold that the issues here imperatively call for
decision now. The case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the
state and county level, by legislation, and by lawsuits.... There has been
entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the con-
stitutional rights .... We accordingly reverse .... " Id. at 4415-16.
A similar point was made by the Court a week later in Baggett v. Bidlit,
32 U.S.L. WEnK 4425 (U.S. June 1, 1964). A three-judge district court
abstained in an action which sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
a Washington statute requiring an oath of allegiance from all teachers on the
grounds that the statute was void for vagueness. The Washington Court
had never been called upon to construe the statute. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action and proceeded to
the merits of the case. One of the reasons the Court gave for refusing to
abstain was that abstention would delay an "ultimate adjudication on the
merits for an undue length of time,... a result quite costly where the
vagueness of a state statute may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms." Id. at 4430. The main reason for the refusal to abstain, how-
ever, was the very vagueness of the statute itself. The question before the
Court was not whether the statute applied, but rather was one as to what
the statute required the plaintiff teachers to do upon taking the oath. The
Court noted that previous cases in which abstention was held proper all
involved "a choice between one or several alternative meanings of a state
statute." Id. In Baggett, however, the statute was "not open to one or a
few interpretations, but to an indefinite number" and the Court found it
"difficult to see how an abstract construction ... in a declaratory judgment
action could eliminate the vagueness from these terms" of the statute. Id.
The Court then added, in strong and positive language, that "it is fictional
to believe that anything less than extensive adjudications, under the impact
of a variety of factual situations, would bring the oath within the bounds of
permissible constitutional certainty. Abstention does not require this." Id.
The decision is sound, for if the result were otherwise, the right to a federal
court adjudication of the constitutional objection of vagueness to state statutes
would be seriously impaired.
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
28 Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
20 Besides leaving the case open so that the federal constitutional issues
may be litigated in .the federal court after the state law is settled, a stay
leaves the federal court in a position to decide the state issues if anything
should prevent getting a decision by the state courts within a reasonable time.
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courts for an adjudication of the state law questions would have to
present only his state law claims to those courts. However, in Gov-
ernment & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor,30 the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who returned to an abstaining
federal court was not entitled to an adjudication of his federal con-
stitutional objections there because he had not "presented" his
federal claims to the state court so as to enable it to construe the
state statute involved "in light of the constitutional objections." 1
This decision, combined with holdings that the plaintiff in such an
abstention case can "elect" to litigate all his claims, state and federal,
in a state court and then seek review in the Supreme Court,8" laid
the basis for a dangerous procedural trap. The Supreme Court gave
no guidelines as to what the plaintiff was required to do in order to
"present" his constitutional objections to the state courts. Neither
did it indicate what, short of seeking review in the Supreme Court,"
would constitute an "election" on the part of the plaintiff to litigate
his constitutional objections in the state courts. If the plaintiff liti-
gated his federal claims in the state courts, normal rules of res
judicata would bar him from relitigating them in a federal court.34
The question became one of how to "present" the constitutional
objections to the state court without "electing" to litigate them
there. The answers to this question were given in a recent Supreme
Court decision.
In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,35
plaintiff chiropractors sought a declaration that the educational re-
quirements of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act were unconstitu-
tional as applied to them, and also sought an injunction against the
act's enforcement as to them. A federal three-judge court ab-
stained sua sponte, 6 staying the proceedings in the federal court
until the courts of Louisiana had an opportunity to construe the
statute and make a determination of the state law issue of whether
the act applied to chiropractors. In the state court, plaintiffs briefed
and argued their fourteenth amendment objections to the applica-
"353 U.S. 364 (1957).
3 fId. at 366.
"NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
"See the cases cited in note 32 supra.
"Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
"375 U.S. 411 (1964).
"England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180 F. Supp.
121 (E.D. La. 1960).
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tion of the act to chiropractors in the belief that the Windsor de-
cision required them to do so. In this way, the constitutional ob-
jections were "presented" to the state court. An intermediate ap-
pellate court held that the act applied to chiropractors and that so
applied, it did not violate the fourteenth amendment.17  The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court refused to review this decision.38 The plaintiffs
then returned to the federal district court and again sought an in-
junction and a declaration that the act, now construed by the state
court to apply to them, violated the fourteenth amendment. The
district court dismissed,3 9 saying that the litigation of the constitu-
tional objections in the state court barred the plaintiffs from raising
them again in the federal court. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal. The Court shed some light on this area by
saying that the willing litigation of their constitutional claims in a
state proceeding, as here, would normally bar a relitigation of them
in the federal courts. The Court, however, was unwilling to apply
the rule announced in the case to these plaintiffs who had only done
what they thought, with some reason,40 Windsor required.40:
", England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 126 So. 2d 51
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
'; England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, Docket No.
45,509, Louisiana Sup. Ct., Feb. 15, 1961.
" England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp.
521 (E.D. La. 1961).
,o The Court expressly noted that Windsor had been interpreted by others,
including the district court here involved, as requiring such a submission of
federal claims to the state courts. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 420 (1964). Further, the Court noted the mis-
leading quality of the abstention order which had directed the "appellants to
obtain a state court determination not of the state question alone but of 'the
issues here presented' ....." Id. at 422 n.14.
,
0a The fact that the rule set out by the court was not applied to the facts
in the case, but was announced to operate prospectively as to all later cases is
an interesting aspect of this case. The decision cannot'be called a "prospec-
tive overruling decision" because it overrules nothing. The decision in
Windsor is not changed. It is said to require nothing more or less than it
ever did. What the case does say is that the plaintiff here was laboring
under a reasonable misapprehension as to what Windsor required. See note
40 supra. The Court seems to be formulating a rule that where willfulness is
required in order to give an act significance and the law by which willfulness
is to be measured is in a confused state, any rule of law, given by the Court
in such a situation which sets forth an objective standard against which to
measure whether the act was willful or not, will be applied prospectively.
This is because the party charged with willfulness cannot be said to have
that subjective state of mind unless there is an objective standard given
by law to measure his acts. Thus, in England, the plaintiff was re-
quired to have willingly litigated his claims in the state courts before the right
to return to federal court was waived. If what Windsor required was un-
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The opinion clarified the meaning of Windsor and gave to liti-
gants in abstention cases the much-needed guidelines for preserving
the right to return to the federal courts. The basic proposition un-
derlying the reasoning of the Court in this area is that a party who
has "properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court
to consider federal constitutional claims"'" should not be unwillingly
deprived of his right to have that court decide those constitutional
issues on the basis of its own findings of fact.4" The abstention
doctrine does not alter this proposition; "its recognition of the role
of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disre-
gard for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions
of federal law."4 From these principles, it necessarily follows that
Windsor does not require the federal claims to be litigated in the
state courts, and the Court so stated. Furthermore, complying with
Windsor by "presenting" his federal claims to the state courts "will
not support a conclusion... that a litigant has freely and without
reservation litigated his federal claims in the state courts and so
elected not to return to the District Court.
' 44
It is obvious now that the presentation of the federal constitu-
tional claims to the state courts as contemplated by Windsor involves
nothing more than drawing the state court's attention to those claims.
The Court in England, however, recognized that the litigant in a
Pullman-type case faces a great temptation to argue the constitutional
issues. This temptation results from what might be called the
"coercive" effect of arguing such claims. That is, if the litigant is
clear, as it was, then he cannot be said to have willingly litigated when such
was done only to comply with what he thought Windsor required.
A somewhat similar view was held by three judges in the Court's opinion
in a recent prosecution for willful evasion of taxes. James v. United States,
366 U.S. 213 (1961). The petitioner failed to pay income taxes on funds
which he had embezzled. He was convicted of willfully attempting to evade
the federal income tax. A previous decision had held such funds not to be
taxable income. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946). In James,
the Court overruled this previous decision and held such funds to be taxable.
The conviction was reversed and the case dismissed with three justices
agreeing in the opinion of the Court that the element of willfulness could
not be found when the former decision had held such income to be non-
taxable. The other three votes for dismissal came from justices who thought
the former decision had been decided correctly. For a full discussion of
this case, see Note, 71 YALE, L.J. 907 (1962).
375 U.S. at 415.
,The Court stressed the importance of the right to a record constructed
by the federal courts. Id. at 416-17.
"Id. at 415-16.
"Id. at 420.
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able to convince a state court that a statute is unconstitutional if
applied to him, the court, in close cases, might be more likely to
construe it to not apply to him.45 In contemplation of such a situa-
tion, perhaps, the England decision states that the litigant may re-
move all doubts as to his intentions by making an explicit reservation
preserving his right to return to the district court "in all events."'"0
This is accomplished by putting into the state record a statement
that "he is exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose
of complying with Windsor, and that he intends, should the state
courts hold against him on the question of state law, to return to the
District Court for disposition of his federal contentions."47  Thus,
when he explicitly makes the reservation, it appears the litigant will
always have the right to return to district court. A reservation of this
type is not necessary to preserve the right to return to the district
court,4" but the litigant in such an abstention case is running a risk
46 Id. at 420-21.16 Id. at 421-22.
47 Id. at 421.
"' Id. at 421. The England decision probably precludes the approach taken
in the case of Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959). There, a Negro plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of North
Carolina voting laws in a federal court. The three-judge district court
abstained because the state law was unsettled and the nature of the constitu-
tional question was uncertain. Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295(E.D.N.C. 1957). The plaintiff then went to the state tribunals and elected
to litigate in those tribunals the constitutionality on its face of a voting re-
quirements statute. The plaintiff did not, however, raise the issue of whether
the law was being applied in a discriminatory manner. The Supreme Court
affirmed the state court holding that the statute was constitutional on its face,
but indicated that the plaintiff could go back to the federal court to litigate
the discriminatory application issue. 360 U.S. at 50. This decision actually
goes further than the scheme of state courts deciding state issues and federal
courts deciding federal issues as envisioned and provided for in the England
decision. It allows the piecemeal litigation of the federal issues in a case.
This result is inconsistent with the rule of res judicata normally applied in
the federal courts. Where the parties and the subject matter are the same
in a second suit as they were in a prior suit, a judgment on the merits in the
prior suit is usually res judicata in the second "not only as respects matters
actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted, but also as respects
any other available matter which might have been presented to that end."
Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 479 (1930). The inconsistency
is perhaps justifiable because the findings of fact made by a federal court
are much more important on issues of discriminatory application than they
are on the issue of on-the-face constitutionality. See Note, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 226, 237-38 (1959). Allowing the litigant to have the more abstract
question of constitutionality on the face decided in the state courts without
giving up the right to have the discrimination issue tried in federal court
would remove to a certain extent the objection to abstention based on time
consumed. It would give the litigant a chance to perhaps get a quicker de-
cision securing his rights and yet leave him in a position to take advantage of
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of being found to have willingly waived that right if he does try to
"coerce" the state court into construing the statute to be inapplicable
to him by arguing the constitutional claims. 9
The England decision is praiseworthy because it clears up the
procedural haze which has obscured the object of abstention by a
federal court in a Pullman-type situation-which is to get an
authoritative determination of state law issues-and because it shows
that abstention is not entirely an abdication of federal jurisdiction.
But the case also points up some serious objections to abstention in
general. Most obvious is the expense involved in taking a case to
the highest court of a state in order to qualify the litigant to have
his federal claims heard in a federal court. Needless to say, this
factor alone is enough to convince many litigants they should "elect"
to have their federal claims heard in the state courts rather than in
the federal courts where the Constitution and Congress have placed
jurisdiction. The time involved in qualifying the party to litigate
his federal constitutional question in the federal courts is also an
objection." It too helps the litigant to ."elect" to have the state
courts decide his constitutional claims. Compounding these objec-
tions is the fact that abstention in Pullman-type cases is no longer
a discretionary maneuver to avoid ticklish problems, but rather is
applied as an iron-clad rule. As Justice Frankfurter said, "where
the issue.., involved the scope of a previously uninterpreted state
statute where, if applicable, was of questionable constitutionality, we
have required District Courts, and not merely sanctioned an exercise
of their discretionary power, to stay their proceedings pending the
the neutrality of the federal courts on the issue of discrimination if the
attack on its face failed. However, it is doubtful whether Lassiter has
survived England because England speaks in terms of giving up the right to
return to the federal courts by willingly litigating constitutional issues in the
state courts. "We now explicitly hold that if a party freely and without
reservation submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates
them there, and has them decided there, then ... he has elected to forego his
right to return to the District Court." England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964).
o The same result should be achieved in diversity cases where the
federal court abstains merely because a difficult question of state law is in-
volved. See cases cited notes 6 & 7 supra. The litigant should be allowed to
return to the federal court for the trial of the case after the state law has
been settled by means of a declaratory judgment. In this way, the litigant
would receive the protection of the federal courts against local prejudice
which diversity is designed to guard against.
"0 See the discussion by Professor Wright of the five-year litigation in
the Windsor case which ended without a decision on the merits. Wright,
supra note 10, at 817-18.
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submission of the state law question to state determination."'" This
indiscriminate use of the abstention technique and the consequent
time and expense involved in getting back into federal court as-
suredly amount to a partial abdication of federal jurisdiction. 2
The use of the federal courts in these situations is effectively re-
moved from those who do not have the time or the money for such
a long, expensive effort. The abstention doctrine is so entrenched
today that it is doubtful that any changes will be made in its applica-
tion despite the objectionable features mentioned here. The lawyer,
however, should keep these possible results in mind and let them be
his guideposts in deciding whether or not to carry his case to the
federal courts.
ROBERT B. LONG, JR.
Real Property-Implied Warranties in New Housing
In a recent Colorado case,1 the purchaser of a house brought suit
against the vendor-builder for loss suffered as a result of the defec-
tive condition of the house. Prior to the purchase of the then in-
completed house, plaintiff inspected the property and noted that
caissons were being constructed for the foundation of the adjoining
house. Upon inquiry about soil conditions, defendant assured plain-
tiff that similar precautions had already been taken in the construc-
tion of his house. After accepting the deed and entering into pos-
session, plaintiff-vendee discovered that the foundation was inade-
quate for the type of soil involved. The Supreme Court of Colorado
held the builder liable for breach of a implied warranty of fitness
for habitation.2
" Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28(1959).
" "Delay which the Pullman doctrine sponsors, keeps the status quo
entrenched and renders 'a defendant's judgment' even in the face of constitu-
tional requirements.... [L]itigants seeking the protection of the federal
courts for assertion of their civil rights will be ground down slowly by the
passage of time and the expenditure of money in state proceedings, leaving
the ultimate remedy here, at least in many cases, an illusory one." England
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 436-37 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
1 Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260 (1963). The defendant-
vendor was held liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
habitability when cracks began appearing in the surfaces of the house.
2 The principal case involved a contract to purchase a house then in
the process of construction; however, although the court allowed recovery
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In the past and to a large extent today, the purchaser of a house
that proves unsuitable for habitation finds his effort to redress the
wrong blocked by the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.4 Al-
though this doctrine has for all practical purposes disappeared from
the law of sales involving chattels,5 a purchaser of real property who
fails or is unable to obtain an express warranty of fitness in the deed
is faced with "the almost universal rule the country over.., that in
the sale of ... [real property] there is no implied warranty on the
part of the vendor of fitness, condition or quality.""
Realizing that the objective of the vendee in purchasing the
house is to live in it, and recognizing that the essence of the contract
is that the house should be fit for habitation, some courts have
allowed recovery on the basis of implied warranty despite the stric-
tures of caveat emptor.7 In liberalizing the traditional doctrine, how-
ever, these courts have restricted implied warranties to cases where
the contract was for the construction of a house or for the purchase
of a house in the process of construction.' Conversely, the doctrine
of caveat emptor is applied where the contract involves the purchase
on the basis of an implied warranty, their reasons for doing so leaves some
doubt as to possible future applications. The court emphasized and seemed
to accord a great deal of weight to the fact that the contract, by its provisions,
set out an express warranty of workmanship, i.e., "house to be completed in
workmanlike manner." - Colo. at -, 387 P.2d at 261. This leaves open
the question of whether it would hold the same way in the absence of such
a contract.8 Although a few courts distinguish an implied warranty of "fitness"
from one of "habitability" when a sale of chattels is involved, for the purpose
of this note they are used interchangeably as applied to real property. Both
refer to whether or not the dwelling is reasonably fit for occupancy as a
dwelling.
' See generally 4 WIU-IsTox, CONTRACTS § 926, (rev. ed. 1936).
'See UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 13-16; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-
314, 2-315.
'Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 300, 188 N.E.2d 780, 785
(1963). In the absence of express warranties in the deed, or of fraud or
concealment, a builder who sells a completed house is thereafter not liable to
the purchaser for damages resulting from latent defects. Gilbert Constr.
Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957) ; Levy v. C. Young Constr.
Co., 46 N.J. Super 293, 134 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957); Vanderschrier v.
Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Shapiro v. Kornicks,
103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore.
479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
"Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A:M
Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Laurel
Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A.2d 263 (1948); Vanderschrier
v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Banks v. City of
Ardmore, 188 Okla. 611, 112 P.2d 372 (1941).8 E.g., Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957);
Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
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of a fully completed structure, whether "new" or secondhand.9 The
courts reason that the vendee of an incomplete structure is unable
to inspect it and therefore must rely entirely upon the vendor-
builder's representations, whereas the vendee of a fully completed
structure has an opportunity to inspect the premises himself and thus
need not rely upon the vendor's representations.1 °
When a court desires to allow recovery but is reluctant to over-
rule the well established principle of caveat emptor," the major
obstacle to recovery under a warranty theory is that the provisions of
the antecedent contract are ordinarily merged in the deed upon its
acceptance and thereby constitute prima facie the final and entire
obligation of the parties.' The doctrine of merger is supported on
the theory that had the parties intended to provide warranties, the
deed would or should have provided written stipulations to that
effect.' 3 If it appears that the deed purported to cover the subject-
matter of the contract, although possibly inconsistent with it, merger
should occur. This follows because, as a rule, the acceptance of a
deed is prima facie an execution of the antecedent contract.1 4 The
'E.g., Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963);
Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955).
" That the ability to inspect a fully completed or a secondhand house is
at best a somewhat dubious distinction is shown by the following cases,
which allowed recovery despite the fact that various contracts for purchase
contained recitals of inspection and nonreliance on representations. Roth-
stein v. Janss Inv. Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941); Cohen
v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960); Wolford v. Freeman, 150
Neb. 537, 35 N.W.2d 98 (1948). The reasoning of these cases was that
the ability to inspect gave the vendee no more assurance than failure to
inspect would, because normally a vendee is unable to discover such defects
as insufficient foundations, leaking roofs, or defective material at the time
the contract was entered into.
"' For a discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The
Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
12 Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517, 161 So. 526 (1935); Duncan v. Mc-
Adams, 222 Ark. 143, 257 S.W.2d 568 (1953); Percifield v. Rosa, 122 Colo.
167, 220 P.2d 546 (1950); Gabel v. Simmons, 100 Fla. 526, 129 So. 777(1930); Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1946); Huffman v.
Landes, 163 Va. 652, 177 S.E. 200 (1934) ; Dunseath v. Hallauer, 41 Wash.
2d 895, 253 P.2d 408 (1953).
" This reasoning assumes that the parties intended to do so and that the
vendee could afford to pay for the inclusion of such warranties in the deed.
Such warranties might well make the cost so prohibitive so as to prevent
their inclusion.4 In Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 41 N.M. 82, 64 P.2d 377 (1936),
it was stated, "in the absence of fraud, mistake, etc., the following stipula-
tions in contracts for the sale of real estate are conclusively presumed to be
merged in a subsequently delivered and accepted deed made in pursuance
of such contract, to wit: (1) Those that inhere in the very subject-matter
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fact that some of the contract provisions were incorporated in the
deed, while others were modified or left out, lends even more weight
to the existing prima facie case in that the parties dealt with these
antecedent agreements selectively.' 5
Some jurisdictions have held that such a merger does not occur."'
They reason that it was not within the contemplation or intention
of the parties that the antecedent contract be entirely merged or
superceded.17  Thus, when the antecedent contract contains pro-
visions relating to quality, fitness or conditions which impose obliga-
tions on the vendor collateral to the provisions concerning title, pos-
session, quantity, or emblements, provisions normally found in deeds,
so as to indicate that their omission from the deed was not intended
as a release of the vendor's obligation, such collateral provisions
should not be merged. Since an implied warranty that the house
will be reasonably fit for its intended purpose is a part of the ante-
cedent contract by implication of law, it follows that such an implica-
tion is "collateral" to the deed and should survive acceptance there-
of.18
of the deed, such as title, possession, emblements... ; (2) those carried into
the deed and of the same effect; (3) those of which the subject-matter con-
flicts with the same subject-matter in the deed. In such cases, the deed alone
must be looked to in determining the rights of the parties." "Id. at 88, 64 P.2d
at 381. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 413 (1932) states that "the acceptance
of a deed of conveyance of land ... discharges the contractual duties of the
seller to the party so accepting. .." except such duties as are "collateral" to
the main purpose of the contract.
"E.g., Duncan v. McAdams, 222 Ark. 143, 257 S.W.2d 568 (1953) ; Gabel
v. Simmons, 100 Fla. 526, 129 So. 777 (1930); Huffman v. Landes, 163 Va.
652, 177 S.E. 200 (1934).
" The following promises survived acceptance of the deed as they were
held to be "collateral" and not intended by the parties to be merged therein:
South Texas Land Co. v. Sorensen, 199 Iowa 699, 202 N.W. 552 (1925)(improvements); Saville v. Chalmers, 76 Iowa 325, 41 N.W. 30 (1888)(warranty of quality of the soil); Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191
Md. 451, 62 A.2d 354 (1948) (warranty of description); Levin v. Cook, 186
Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1946) (warranty of fitness of heating plant); Hill v.
Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951) (warranty of fitness of
freezer plant); Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W._d 225 (Tex. Civ.
App.) (warranty-of sufficiency of foundation), rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d
922 (1944). See note 20 infra.
E.g., Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
"[I]f the delivery of the deed is only one of a number of things to be
performed under the terms of the contract, the delivery of the deed constitutes
part performance, and the other matters to be performed remain obligatory."
Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260, 263 (1963). However,
in Robbins v. C. W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 251 N.C. 663, 111 S.E.2d 884(1960), the court allowed recovery for breach of contract, thereby avoiding
the question of whether or not the provisions of the antecedent contract were
merged in the deed. This theory of recovery seems well established in
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Two courts have faced this problem of defective housing square-
ly, refusing to allow the complications of caveat emptor and merger
to obscure the need for effective relief.1" In Loma Vista Dev. Co. v.
Johnson," a case involving a new house completed before the con-
tract to purchase, the court implied a warranty, saying, "by offering
the house for sale as a new and complete structure... [the vendor-
builder] impliedly warranted that it was properly constructed and
of good material... ."" This case is a notable departure from the
normal holding because it extends implied warranty to its logical
extreme to include a completed dwelling as well as a dwelling in the
process of construction, and it implied the warranty without the aid
or effect of any express provisions in the contract.
Because of the difficulty in applying the merger rule,2 2 the harsh-
ness of caveat emptor, and a hesitancy to invoke the apparently
limitless theory of implied warranties,23 some courts have adapted
such accepted theories as fraud, mistake or misrepresentation to
hold a vendor liable where the vendee has been led to accept a house
North Carolina in that the Robbins case cited and followed earlier cases also
allowing recovery for breach of contract. See also Childress v. C. W. Myers
Trading Post, Inc., 247 N.C. 150, 100 S.E.2d 391 (1957).
" Sterbcow v. Peres, 222 La. 850, 64 So. 2d 195 (1953); Loma Vista Dev.
Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180
S.W.2d 922 (1944). See note 20 infra. In Sterbcow it was held that
an implied warranty was created by all sales unless expressly excluded,
or the defect was discoverable by a reasonable inspection. However,
in taking a position contrary to the common law view of caveat emptor,
the court was guided by a statute which permitted "the avoidance of a sale
on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders its use
so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would
not have purchased it, had he known of the vice." LA. CiT. CODE ANN. art.
2520 (1952).
" 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d 922(1944). Here, the trial court entered judgment for the purchaser. The
court of civil appeals remanded because there was no proof of a legal measure
of damages, but held that the builder's agent had authority to represent facts
in regard to the foundation because the builder "impliedly warranted that it
was properly constructed and of good material .... " 177 S.W.2d at 227.
The supreme court reversed both lower courts, holding that the agent had
no authority to represent facts in regard to the foundation. It failed to dis-
cuss the implied warranty found by the court of civil appeals.
"
11d. at 227. See note 20 supra.
22 See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text. It is not evident in those
cases in North Carolina that allow recovery for breach of contract that the
court is circumventing the merger rule, as it is never discussed.
2242 N.C.L. Ruv. 468 (1964). This note shows to some extent the ap-
parently unlimited applications of the warranty theories by holding a cigarette
manufacturer liable for lung cancer.
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which varies from the contract stipulations.2 4 North Carolina is
among these states.2 5
A typical statement of the North Carolina view is as follows:
"ordinarily, the maxim of caveat emptor applies equally to sales of
real and personal property, and will be adhered to where there is no
fraud."2 6  The fraud necessary for vendor liability may be com-
mitted by a suppression of the truth as well as by a false representa-
tion or suggestion." The crux of the problem in respect to fraud
in housing construction has been the question of how much the
2, See cases cited in 23 Am. JuR. Fraud and Deceit § 169 (1939).
' Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N.C. 757, 759, 36 S.E. 153, 154 (1900).
' Where liability is based on "suppression of the truth," the rule generally
followed is that "where material facts are accessible to the vendor only, and
he knows them not to be within the reach of diligent attention, observation andjudgment of the purchaser, the vendor is bound to disclose such facts, and
make them known to the purchaser." Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 253
N.C. 214, 217, 116 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1960). Fraud may also be committed by
means of deceptive statements or conduct which are intended to create an
erroneous impression in another's mind to thereby induce some act or fore-
bearance with reference to property rights to his disadvantage. Mitchell v.
Strickland, 207 N.C. 141, 176 S.E. 468 (1934). Thus "half-truths" which
are meant to be and are reasonably relied upon fall within this category.
Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N.C. 273, 62 S.E. 1067 (1908). When,
however, a vendor represents or implies that the house has been constructed
according to specifications agreed to by the vendee, North Carolina applies a
different test to determine whether or not the representation or implication
is such as will allow recovery. Assuming falseness established, in order to
recover under this theory the vendee would have to show that: (1) he
reasonably relied on the false representation to his detriment; (2) they
constituted a material inducement to the contract; and (3) he acted with
ordinary prudence. Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N.C. 757, 36 S.E. 153 (1900).
In addition, if the vendee could further prove that the vendor had by some
artifice concealed the defect, his case would be materially strengthened. In
Walsh v. Hall, 66 N.C. 233 (1872), it was stated that if the defect is patent
and the vendee accepts the representation and acts upon it "with his eyes
open," the rule of caveat emptor applies "unless... [the vendee] has been
prevented from making proper inquiry by some artifice or contrivance of the
other party." Id. at 239. Accord, Leonard v. Southern Power Co., 155 N.C.
10, 70 S.E. 1061 (1911). An important factor to be noted is that it is
necessary for the vendee to prove that the representations were not merely
expressions of commendation, opinion or extravagant statements as to value.
Such "puffing" generally does not constitute sufficient fraud so as to impose
liability. Frey v. Middle Creek Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 759, 57 S.E. 464
(1907); National Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N.C. 652, 50 S.E. 306
(1905); Stovall v. Newell, 158 Ore. 206, 75 P.2d 346 (1938). By applying
this test to the principal case of Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d
260 (1963), where the purchaser discovered the soil condition prior to
contracting to purchase the house, North Carolina would deny recovery on the
ground that there was no further duty owed the vendee since the necessary
elements are not present. See Brown v. Gray, 51 N.C. 103 (1858) (knowl-
edge of the defect by the vendor); Cobb v. Fogalman, 23 N.C. 440 (1841)
(lack of knowledge by the vendee).
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vendor-builder is required to disclose when making sales. Generally,
courts have shown a liberal tendency to require "that full disclosure
of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct
demands it."2'  In Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co.,29 North Carolina's
leading case in this area, the evidence showed that the builder had
filled a large hole on the lot with trees, stumps, and limbs, then
covered the hole over without disclosing the fact. When the plaintiff
entered into possession without knowledge of the filled conditions,
the house began to settle causing doors to jam and the ceiling to crack.
The court found that such evidence made out a case of actionable
fraud sufficient to carry the case to the jury since the defect was not
apparent to the purchasers and was not within the reach of their
diligent attention and observation. The court stated that "where
material facts are accessible to the vendor only, and he knows them
not to be within the reach of the diligent attention... [and] ob-
servation of the... [vendee],"30 the vendor is required to disclose
such facts to the vendee.
It has been held, however, that the purchaser's knowledge of the
conditions of the property prior to the sale absolves the seller of any
liability for concealing the conditions from the purchaser.,, When
such a situation arises, the doctrine of implied warranty for fitness
would seem to add a useful theory for the vendee who cannot estab-
lish actionable fraud.32  The vendee in the principal case was faced
with such a situation.38 He had knowledge of the conditions of the
soil, but the measures taken to compensate for these conditions
were inadequate; thus, the plaintiff's only avenue of relief lay in
implied warranty.
Where recovery is based on fraud, mistake or misrepresentation,
it is apparent that such distinctions as whether the contract is for
the construction of a house, for a house in the process of construc-
28 PROSSER, TORTS § 87, at 535 (2d ed. 1955).
29253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
30 Id. at 217, 116 S.E.2d at 457.
" Haddad v. Abel, 186 Cal. App. 2d 292, 8 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1960).
"In Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960), where the
purchasers were elderly women and the vendor failed to disclose that the
property consisted of filled land, the vendor was held liable for fraud. In
the principal case, however, because the vendee discovered the soil condition
prior to entering into the contract, he would be unable to recover under a
fraud theory. Nevertheless, he could recover for breach of an implied
warranty of fitness.
" Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
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tion, or for a new or secondhand dwelling, are no longer necessary.
s4
In view of the large sales volume of houses already completed before
the sale and sold as "new" or secondhand dwellings, the theory of
implied warranty, unless applied without restriction, 5 does not go far
enough to give adequate protection to the vendee. It is submitted
that the traditional theories of fraud, mistake or misrepresentation
afford a vendee adequate relief, place a more substantial burden on
the vendor-builder, and effectively blunt the harshness of the common
law doctrine of caveat emptor. On the other hand, the principal
case indicates that the requirements for actionable fraud remain strict
and in many cases difficult to prove. In such a case recent decisions
in the area of implied warranties offer a promise of relief for unwary
purchasers of defective housing.
Underlying the entire area of implied warranties and the retreat
from the harshness of caveat emptor as applied to the sale of real
property is a revolution in the production of housing analogous to
earlier changes in the production of chattels which culminated in
the mass production methods we know today."6 Coinciding with
the movement toward mass production of chattels was a change in
sales law from caveat emptor toward a warranty imposed by reason
of the common or implied understanding that the article purchased
would be merchantable or of fair average quality where the buyer
relied upon the seller for determination of this fact." With the
increased industrialization of the building industry, the mass con-
struction of housing and corresponding demand, vendees are turning
to the courts for relief similar to that which courts were asked to give
when an improved technology first permitted the production of chat-
tels in large quantity. 3 Courts should be frank to admit that the
" See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
" See Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.),
rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d 922 (1944). See note 20 supra.
"See note 11 supra.
'T Because of a cursory inspection or a lack of knowledge of what to
inspect, many latent but material defects are not discovered. Nonetheless,
whether the defect be found in a chattel or in real property, if a court should
find it discoverable by reasonable inspection, recovery will be denied. Stevens
v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948). See generally 1 WILLISTON,
SALES § 207 (rev. ed. 1948).
" In Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959), in order to avoid
the problem of property warranties and caveat emptor, the vendee of a
new house contended that the defective heating and air conditioning system
that had been installed in the house was personalty and not realty and was
therefore governed by sales law. This theory was rejected by the court on
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
old doctrines and distinctions are simply not adequate to meet the
needs of the changing technology of the building industry and the
corresponding needs of purchasers. A realistic appraisal will reveal
that the doctrine of implied warranty offers a solution to a growing
problem.
RiCHARD L. BURROWS
Securities Regulation-'"Fraud" to Include Nondisclosure
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 makes it
unlawful for an investment adviser, by the use of the mails or
facilities of interstate commerce, "(1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client... ."I Section
209(e) of the Act gives the Securities and Exchange Commission
the power to bring an action for injunction, and the district courts
power to enjoin such activities, when it has been shown that "any
person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or
practice constituting a violation of... [such] provision .... 2
Because of the general language of the antifraud provision quoted
above, it was not known what fraudulent and deceptive activities
were prohibited by this act or to what extent the Commission was
limited in this area by common law concepts of fraud and deceit,'
which would include proof of: (1) false representation of a material
fact; (2) an intent to induce reliance; (3) actual reliance on the false
representation; and (4) damage suffered as a result.4
The meaning of the statute was clarified in the recent case of
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.5 The Commission
sought to obtain a preliminary injunction under section 206 to com-
pel an investment advisory service and its president to disclose to
the ground that the system was a fixture and therefore governed by the
applicable realty laws.
'lnvestment Advisers Act of 1940, §§206(l)-(2), 54 Stat. 852, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1963).
' Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(e), 54 Stat. 853, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (Supp. IV 1963).
'S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960); H. REP. No. 2179,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1960).
'3 Loss, SEcuriTiES REGULATION 1430 (2d ed. 1961); S. REP. No. 1760,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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their clients a practice of buying securities just before advising their
purchase, and then selling them at a profit upon the price rise fol-
lowing the recommendation-commonly called "scalping." There
was no evidence in the case that "any misstatements or false figures
were contained in any of the bulletins," or that "the investment ad-
vice was unsound," or that "the defendants were being bribed to
tout a stock contrary to their beliefs," or that "these bulletins were
a scheme to get rid of worthless stock."6  Instead, the case was
premised wholly upon the fact that shortly before recommending them
to their clients, the defendants purchased shares of certain securities;
that following publication of the recommendations, there were small
rises in the market price of each of the stocks; that the defendants
then sold at a profit the shares previously purchased. In one instance
the defendants sold short7 shares of stock before commenting
unfavorably about that security, and then covered their short posi-
tion at a profit upon the resulting drop in market price.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that "scalping"
without disclosure to clients did not operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any client within the meaning of the act, since there was no
showing of intent to injure clients or actual injury to them." That
is, "fraud" was interpreted strictly, requiring intent to injure and
actual injury, both elements of common law fraud.
In reversing, the Supreme Court said that the defendants' activi-
ties created a potential conflict of interest, and held that the Com-
mission could get the injunction because "failure to disclose ma-
terial facts must be deemed fraud or deceit .... -" The Court
reviewed the history of the SEC acts and concluded that Congress
passed them with their antifraud provisions because the common law
remedies for fraud and deceit were ill-suited to be applied to securi-
ties transactions, due to the intangible nature of securities.' 0 To
effect the remedial purposes of the provisions, the Court said, they
should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexi-
"Id. at 185.
"The term 'short sale' means any sale of a security which the seller does
not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security
borrowed by, or for the account of the seller." SEC Rule 3b-3, 17 C.F.R.
240.3b-3 (1949).
'SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1962) (in banc), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
:375 U.S. at 200.
'0 Id. at 194-95. See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities
Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
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bly .... 11" The Court further said that one of the purposes of the
acts was "to substitute a philosophy of disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor" and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry. 2 As a result of the status created
by the SEC acts, the Court reasoned, an investment adviser is a
fiduciary and has a duty to disclose material facts to its clients; fail-
ure to make such disclosure operates as a fraud upon its clients,
whether or not there is intent to injure or actual injury. The Court
felt that such disclosure would tend to preserve the climate of fair
dealing necessary to maintain public confidence in the securities in-
dustry and thus would be beneficial to the economy of the country.
Justice Harlan voiced the lone dissente2a maintaining that there
was a lack of proof that the defendants' investment advice was not
disinterested. It would seem, however, that "scalping" does create
interests for an investment adviser which would be in conflict with
those of his clients and which might influence his decisions in making
recommendations to them. For example, he might be tempted to
recommend a volatile stock which would respond more favorably to
his recommendation than would a more solid stock. Another con-
flict of interests might arise if, after having bought the stock, but
before having recommended it, he got unfavorable information re-
garding it, in light of which he would not have recommended it,
had he not already taken a position in that security; in such a sitUa-
tion, he might be tempted to go ahead and recommend it anyway.
A client might choose to follow the advice of an investment adviser
despite the possibility of such a conflict of interest. Nonetheless,
he should be given the information that a conflict does exist, so that
he can choose whether or not to ignore it, rather than be left com-
pletely in the dark. It would seem that the majority reached the
better result in saying that the fiduciary relationship between an in-
vestment adviser and his client requires disclosure in this situation,
despite the absence of an explicit provision requiring disclosure. 12b
Although justice Harlan's dissent is not predicated upon lack of
materiality, it conveys the impression that he felt the omissions in
the case to be immaterial. Such an opinion would necessarily prevent
him from agreeing with the majority. Since an investment adviser
11 375 U.S. at 195.
12 375 U.S. at 198.
12a 375 U.S. at 203.
12b 375 U.S. at 198.
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cannot be required to disclose everything about every security he
recommends, for practical reasons, his duty of disclosure must neces-
sarily be limited only to those facts which are material, even under
the most liberal reading of the act.
The principal case marks the first time that the Supreme Court
has held failure to disclose a material fact to be fraud under any of
the securities regulation acts. However, lower court and SEC de-
cisions have interpreted antifraud provisions similar to those in the
principal case to include such nondisclosure, although under facts
perhaps more conducive to a finding that there was actual intent to
defraud.:" A brief look at some of these cases might shed light on
the statutory interpretation in the principal case.
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC4 involved sales of stock by
customers' men at prices substantially above the over-the-counter
price, without disclosing that the sale price was above the market
price; there was conflicting testimony as to whether or not untrue
statements had been made regarding the market price. In a petition
to review an order which revoked the petitioner's registration as a
broker and dealer, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
there need be no specific finding of whether or not the alleged state-
ments had been made, since the failure to reveal the markup was
both an omission to state a material fact and a fraudulent device,
thus violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.'" The
court said that the law of fraud knows no difference between express
misrepresentation on the one hand and implied misrepresentation on
the other.'
In another case, Hughes v. SEC, 7 the petitioner acted in a dual
" See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d
795, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99
F. Supp. 808 (1951), modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
' 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
1 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958), which provides:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any instruments or means of transportation in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property
by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3)
to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
139 F.2d at 437.
174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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capacity of investment adviser and of broker and dealer. In such
capacity she sold her own shares to clients without fully disclosing
such things as the best price at which such securities could be
purchased in the open market and the cost to her of the securities
sold to such clients. In sustaining the revocation of the petitioner's
registration, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied on
express language in the Securities Act making unlawful "any omis-
sion to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.... ."s The court also said that the acts
constituted violations of the antifraud sections of the 19339 and
19340 acts, and the regulations21 thereunder, as well as saying that
they were omissions to state facts necessary to clarify half-truths,
which was expressly made unlawful.
A third case, Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,22 involved a class
action on behalf of minority shareholders against the majority
shareholder of the corporation, charging that the defendant had
fraudulently deprived them of their rightful participation in the
liquidation of the corporation. The majority shareholder had
offered to buy the shares of the minority shareholders without dis-
closing facts which indicated the value of the stock to be much greater
than the price that the defendant offered to pay. In holding that the
defendant violated Rule X-10B-5 concerning corporate "insiders," '28
the district court said:
" Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a) (2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (2) (1958).
" Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§77q(a) (1958).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C.
§78j(b) (1958); § 15, as amended, 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §780 (1958).
21Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1949); Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15cl-2 (1949).
" 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d
369 (3d Cir. 1956).
" The rule, now denominated Rule lOb-5, declares it unlawful: "for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
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Defendant's liability for non-disclosure is not based primarily
upon the provision of subparagraph 2-subparagraph 1 of the
Rule makes it unlawful "To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud" and subparagraph 3 outlaws "any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person...". The three subparagraphs of this
broadly remedial rule are mutually supporting and not mutually
exclusive as defendant contends. Defendant's breach of its duty
of disclosure accordingly can be viewed as a violation of all three
subparagraphs of the Rule, i.e., (1) a device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud; (2) an implied misrepresentation or misleading
omission; and (3) an act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud upon the plaintiffs.24
Although the above cases did not concern the provisions of the
Investment Advisers Act, they did concern provisions which are
almost identical to those in question. 5 As a matter of fact, the
antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act were modeled
from subsections (1) and (3) of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act,20 the same section from which Rule lOb-5 was copied.27 Thus
the decisions interpreting the provisions of section 17(a) and Rule
10b-5 should be applied with equal force in interpreting section 206
of the 1940 act. It should be noted, however, that each of the cases
involved partial nondisclosure, and not complete failure to disclose.
In 1962 the SEC imposed a penalty upon a stockbroker for non-
disclosure when he traded for discretionary accounts on information
concerning a dividend decrease received from a corporate insider
who was his business associate. That is, liability was imposed under
the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 for mere nondisclosure.
The decision, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.,2- has been hailed
as exemplifying a continuing expansion of the scope of liability un-
der Rule 10b-5."9
Although section 206 has now been amended so that it apparently
:'99 F. Supp. at 829.
2 For the text of Rule lOb-5, see note 23 supra; for the text of section
17(a), see note 15 supra.
" 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1515 (2d ed. 1961); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 753 (1961), aff'd on rehearing,
306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962) (in banc), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
"'JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS
793 (1963).
28 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961.
"E.g., Notes: 62 CoLuM. L. REV. 735 (1962); 75 HARV. L. REv. 1449
(1962); 48 VA. L. REV. 398 (1962); 71 YALE L.J. 736 (1962).
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covers "scalping," 3° the nearly unanimous approval by the Supreme
Court of the liberal interpretation of the provisions in this case
should certainly have an impact upon securities regulation in the
future. It should facilitate regulation of the industry, since broad
legislation-intended to be interpreted broadly-can be enacted with
reasonable assurance that its effect will not be unduly restricted by
marrow interpretation.
COWLES LIIPFERT
Torts-Ifdependent Contractors-Duty of Care
In Heldenfels v. Hernandez' an employee of the owner of
property on which construction work was being done brought action
against a paving subcontractor for injuries sustained by the employee
'when struck by a backing truck. The jury found that the subcon-
tractor failed to provide a flagman to warn the employee of the
backing truck but found no affirmative negligence. The Texas
court held that the plaintiff -was merely a licensee as to the subcon-
tractor and that it had breached no duty owed to the landowner's
employee by its failure to provide a flagman. Even though the
subcontractor owned no interest in the land, the court reasoned that
it became an occupant of the private premises for the purpose of the
construction work, and that although an occupier or owner of land
may owe to a licensee the duty to warn him of concealed hazardous
conditions, there is no duty to warn him of dangers on the land which
are not concealed.
Owners and occupiers of land have been given immunities con-
cerning the exercise of care which are not, as a general rule, available
to others. It may be broadly stated that an owner or occupier has
no duty of care toward a trespasser except the duty not to wilfully
injure him He has a duty toward licensees which includes a duty
to warn of concealed dangerous conditions of the premises of which
"0 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(4), added by § 9, 74 Stat. 887
(1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. IV 1963).
1366 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
'Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Hooker v. Routt
Realty Co., 102 Colo. 8, 76 P.2d 431 (1938); Previte v. Wanskuck Co., 80
R.I. 1, 90 A.2d 769 (1952). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.1(1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
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he has knowledge.3 He has no duty to use care to inspect his
premises or take precautions for the safety of a licensee.4  The
principal case raises the question who, if anyone, should be permitted
to take advantage of the limited duties of the owner or occupier of
land. On this question there is a solid division of authority in this
country. Generally all courts agree that these immunities of the
owner or occupier extend to the members of his household and to his
servants during the course of their employment.5 The Restatement
of Torts adds independent contractors to the list of those who may
derive the benefit of these exemptions,6 and several jurisdictions, in-
cluding the Texas court in the principal case, have adopted this view.t
Other courts have limited the exemptions to those designated either
as "owner," "possessor" or "occupant." These courts have taken
the view that on strictly technical and historical grounds the exemp-
tions should apply only to those who have a proprietary interest in the
land.8 The term "possession" in this context is held to mean under
one's control and the right to exclude every other person from dealing
with it.9 The term "occupant" ordinarily implies a person having
possessory rights who can control any activity on the premises. 10
There are reasonable grounds for extending a landowner's ex-
emptions to the members of his family for a verdict against a mem-
'See, e.g., Straight v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 354 Pa. 391, 47 A.2d 605(1946). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES § 27.1 (1956).
'Rosenberger v. Consolidated Coal Co., 318 Ill. App. 8, 47 N.E.2d 491(1943); Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky. 406, 169 S.W.2d 4 (1943); Myszkiewicz
v. Lord Baltimore Filling Stations, Inc., 168 Md. 642, 178 AUt. 856 (1935).
See, e.g., Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 4 Cal. 2d 499,
50 P.2d 803 (1935); Mikaelian v. Palaza, 300 Mass. 354, 15 N.E.2d 480(1938) ; Sohn v. Katz, 112 N.J.L. 106, 169 AUt. 838 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 382 (1938).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 383 (1938).
McIntyre v. Converse, 238 Mass. 592, 131 N.E. 198 (1921); Waller v.
Smith, 116 Wash. 645, 200 Pac. 95 (1921). Annot., 90 A.L.R. 886 (1934).
It is now probably the majority opinion that one who maintains wires over
another's land cannot take advantage of the landowner's exemptions. Annot.,
56 A.L.R. 1021 (1928).
'Fort Wayne & N. I. Traction Co. v. Stark, 74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N.E.
460 (1920); Godfrey v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 299 Mo. 472, 253
S.W. 233 (1923); Cooper v. North Coast Power Co., 117 Ore. 652, 244 Pac.
665 (1926).
'Green v. Menveg Properties, Inc., 126 Cal. 2d 1, 271 P.2d 544 (1954).
It is that condition of facts under which one can exercise his power over a
corporeal thing to the exclusion of all other persons. Starits v. Avery, 204
Iowa 401, 213 N.W. 769 (1927).
" United States v. Fox, 60 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Lechler v. Chapin,
12 Nev. 65 (1877) ; Wittkop v. Garner, 4 N.J. Misc. 234, 132 At. 339 (Sup.
Ct. 1926).
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ber of the family will in all probability ultimately fall on the shoulders
of the landowner. The extension of these exemptions to his servants
during the course of their employment may also be justified, for if
the servant is held liable, the master may also be liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. To deny the servant the exemption
would deprive the landowner of that to which the law says he is
entitled. No such result would follow in refusing to extend the
exemptions to an independent contractor. The Restatement of Torts
recognizes a distinction between one who is on the land "on behalf
of" the landowner, such as an independent contractor, and one on
the land in some other capacity, such as an easement owner."1 The
former but not the latter, according to the Restatement, gets the
landowner's immunity. Dean Prosser says that this distinction
reconciles most of the cases.'1
Dean Prosser's observation may well explain the North Caro-
lina court's refusal to extend the exemptions in some early cases,
but one who looks at the cases with the cynic's eye might well wonder
if the results might not be explained by something other than the
"on behalf of" theory. In most of the cases in which the court has
specifically refused to extend the exemptions to the holder of an
easement, the defendant was an electric power company.' Since
the exemptions stem from land ownership, it would appear that the
easement owner would be more entitled to the exemptions than would
a defendant who has no interest in the land of any kind. The in-
clusion of the independent contractor stands on a different footing
than the inclusion of members of the landowner's family or his
servants. Upon analysis it would seem to be unjustified upon any
sound grounds. His exclusion from the requirement of using due
care does not spring from the land, for he has no interest in the land.
He is not an "occupant," "owner" or "possessor" as these terms
are used in designating an estate in land.Y4
11RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 383-86 (1938).
12 PROSSER, TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955). According to Dean Prosser the
"in behalf of" theory extends the landowner immunities to independent con-
tractors who are acting in behalf of the landowner and denies the immunities
to those, such as electric power companies, who have an easement across the
lands of another in order to further their own interest.
"' Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co., 172 N.C. 682, 90 S.E. 893 (1916);
Benton v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448
(1914).
" For a discussion of these terms see Garver v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 69
Iowa 202, 28 N.W. 555 (1886); Nevin v. Louisville Trust Co., 258 Ky.
187, 79 S.W.2d 688 (1935).
[Vol. 42
NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina seems to have agreed with the absurdity of
allowing one to defend on the grounds that the plaintiff was a
trespasser as to a third party, although it should be kept in mind
the considerations as to whether or not the defendant was on the
land in his own behalf rather than "on behalf of" the landowner.
In Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co.15 the court aptly stated the basis
of the exemption from the duty of reasonable care as being "a
principle growing out of and dependent upon the rights of ownership
and considered essential to their proper enjoyment.... [R]ecovery
is not... denied merely because... the injured party is himself a
trespasser"' 0 (to a third party). In Benton v. North Carolina Pub.
Serv. Corp.'T a child was killed while climbing a tree growing on land
over which defendant held an easement when the child came in
contact with defendant's poorly insulated wires. It was held that
"it is immaterial to consider whether the boy killed was a trespasser.
He certainly was not trespassing upon any property of the de-
fendant." 8 Although the defendant's easement merely contemplated
Denial of recovery can be best explained by the fact that there was no
negligence. In Ellis v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 24 Tenn. App. 279, 143
S.W.2d 108 (1939), the defendant was employed to fumigate the residence
of the plaintiff. To effectuate this purpose it was necessary that the plaintiff
and his family vacate the residence for twenty-four hours. The plaintiff's
intestate, a child of tender years, entered the house and was asphyxiated.
The evidence disclosed that the defendant had warned the family of the
extreme danger involved and of the imperative necessity of remaining out of
the house for twenty-four hours; in addition the defendant had locked the
house from the inside, placed two substantial padlocks on the two outside
doors, and placed large red-lettered warning signs around the premises.
The court found no liability on the basis that the deceased child was a
trespasser.
In Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 4 Cal. 2d 499, 50
P.2d 803 (1935), General Steamship Company had general control of the
dock where the defendant was engaged in loading a ship. The steamship
company required persons to obtain from them a permit to go upon the dock.
Plaintiff, without permission, went on the dock and in so doing went upon a
portion which he would have been guided around had he obtained permission.
While on this portion of the dock he was struck by a bale of paper which
the defendant knocked off the balcony of the warehouse. It was held that
since plaintiff was present without permission of defendant and that as he
had no business with either defendant or the ship hewas a trespasser and
defendant only owed a duty to refrain from wilful injury. The court could
have better supported a decision of no liability on the basis of no duty
because of the unforeseeability of someone being in the restricted area without
permission.
172 N.C. 682, 90 S.E. 893 (1916).10Id. at 684, 90 S.E. at 893-94.
'"165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448 (1914).
I81d. at 357, 81 S.E. at 449.
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transmission lines, he obviously had more of an interest in the land
than would a mere independent contractor.
In 1937 Mr. Pafford'9 seemed to have brought North Carolina
in line with the Restatement,20 and those jurisdictions which have
adopted its view,21 by falling down an elevator shaft maintained by
an independent contractor on the property of another. The court in
denying recovery designated Mr. Pafford a licensee. The court
seems to have given no thought to the possibility that in relieving the
defendant from the exercise of due care while on the premises of
another, it was relieving defendant from such duty altogether, as it
may reasonably be assumed that its business will always be carried
out on the property of another. It is not disclosed whether or not
Mr. Pafford was left with the ability to ponder this question. The
court made no reference to its earlier decisions and in designating
the defendant as one in possession there is no indication that serious
consideration was given to the question.
A defendant who was engaged in activity similar to the defendant
in the Pafford case was held to the duty of exercising due care in
Bemont v. Isenhour,2 2 but on the theory that the plaintiff's position
with respect to the defendant was "at least that of an invitee." The
court seems to imply that recovery would have been denied otherwise,
and yet the proper test would seem to be whether or not the plaintiff's
presence and resulting injury could have been reasonably foreseen by
the defendant.
In McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator CoY2 an independent con-
tractor was repairing an elevator located in a medical clinic. The
plaintiff was on her way to see one of the doctors when she fell down
the shaft as a result of the defendant having left the elevator door
open. The court held that the defendant was chargeable with the
duty of exercising reasonable care for the safety of those who
rightfull use or attempt to use the elevator. No mention was made
in the opinion as to plaintiff's position as either invitee or licensee,
and except for the qualifying clause emphasized it would appear
that the court was reaffirming its earlier decisions not to consider
" Pafford v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 217 N.C. 730, 9 S.E.2d 408 (1940).
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 382 (1938).
" Key West Elec. Co. v. Roberts, 81 Fla. 743, 89 So. 122 (1921); Hafey
v. Turners Falls Power & Elec. Co., 240 Mass. 155, 133 N.E. 107 (1921);
Parshall v. Lapeer Gas-Elec. Co., 228 Mich. 80, 199 N.W. 599 (1924).
22249 N.C. 106, 105 S.E.2d 431 (1958).
22230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E.2d 45 (1949).
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the limitations of a landowner's duty except in cases involving a
landowner, members of his household or his servants. Again
whether or not the defendant could reasonably foresee harm re-
sulting to someone would seem to be the proper test as to whether the
defendant be chargeable with the duty to exercise reasonable care
for their safety, rather than any label which might be attached to
the body Hying at the bottom of the shaft. The exemptions tradi-
tionally extended to a landowner require these labels, but there seems
to be no good reason to extend such exemptions further.
It is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty what po-
sition the North Carolina court would take if called upon to decide
head-on whether an independent contractor was entitled to the
exemptions allowed the landowner or possessor on whose premises he
was conducting his activity. In the cases noted here the defendants
were held to have a duty of due care with the exception of the
Pafford case. Quaere if the court there did not inadvertently give
to the words "one in possession" a wider scope than they would have
been willing to give after deliberate consideration of the possible
effect of such extension. It is conceivable that a building contractor
might lease the premises upon which he had contracted to construct
a building in order to acquire the immunities granted to such proprie-
tary interest. Were this the purpose it would seem to be an attempt
to contract away his liability. The courts have consistently held such
contracts void as being detrimental to the public good.24 It is in-
conceivable that the court would consciously do for the independent
contractor that which they would not tolerate his doing for himself.
It would also seem that the court would be very reluctant to de-
liberately overrule the sound logic of the earlier cases which held that
a trespass was immaterial if only an infringement upon the rights of
a third party. 5
The landowner has been a favorite of the law. According to
Blackstone the right of private ownership of property was one of the
three absolute rights of English law. The law's regard for this
right was so great that it would "not authorize the least violation
of it ... even for the general good of the whole community. '2 6
24Brown v. Postal Tel. Co., 111 N.C. 187, 16 S.E. 179 (1892); Jankele v.
Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936).
" Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co. 172 N.C. 682, 90 S.E. 893 (1916);
Benton v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448(1914).
" 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138.
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The exemption was applied with harshness and inflexability. From
this strict observance of the sanctity of property, courts have at-
tempted to restrict the application of the exemptions in particular
instances through classification of plaintiffs into categories such as
"trespasser," "licensee" or "invitee." The landowner's freedom
from a duty was in this manner modified. Even as to the trespasser
most courts have discarded the "wilful or wanton" formula and have
stated that a duty of due care is owed to preceived trespassers.27
The many decisions creating exceptions to the limitations of a
landowner's duty would seem to illustrate an attempt to confine the
exemptions allowed within narrow limits. The principal case would
appear to be a marked reversal of this trend and should merit close
examination and critical appraisal.
Lucius M. CHESHIRE
09See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES § 27.1.
